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I. INTRODUCTION
In America, few things evoke more political controversy than guns,
and as with many contentious public policy issues, participants in the
American gun debate tend to polarize into two camps.1  Advocates of
stricter regulations claim that high rates of gun ownership cause in-
creases in violent crime and that allowing even law-abiding adults to
carry firearms in public results in a net loss to public safety.2  Propo-
nents of more permissive gun laws disagree, arguing that lawful gun
ownership and possession deter crime and that the primary effect of
restrictions on the carry of firearms is to disarm the law-abiding and
make them more vulnerable to attack by the violent.3  This debate
gained considerable attention during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
when many states began to enact more permissive concealed carry
laws,4 and it intensified in recent years as the country witnessed
1. The gun policy debate is outside the scope of this Article and contains many nu-
ances not covered here.  This Article offers a broad summary of the competing
positions merely to show the political perspectives that have fueled (and will con-
tinue to fuel) Second Amendment litigation.
2. For articulations of this view, see About Gun Violence, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PRE-
VENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.bradycampaign.org/?q=about-gun-violence (last
visited Aug. 14, 2013); Charles C. Branas et al., Investigating the Link Between
Gun Possession and Gun Assault, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2034 (2009).
3. For perhaps the most well-known articulation of this view, see JOHN R. LOTT JR.,
MORE GUNS LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (3d ed.
2010). See also Gun Control Fact Sheet 2004, GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA, http://
gunowners.org/fs0404.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
4. In 1987, Florida triggered this trend by enacting a modern “right to carry” law
that requires the issuance of a concealed weapons permit to any applicant who
meets objective statutory requirements. FLA. STAT. § 790.06 (2012).  Currently,
the number of states with similar “shall issue” statutory permitting regimes
totals forty.  These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75(a)(1) (2013); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700 (2010); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-12-203 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
3302 (2010); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/10 (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE § 35-47-2-3
(LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE § 724.7 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c03
(1997 & 2012 Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110 (LexisNexis 2007); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (2008) (amended 2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 2003
(2000 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 28.422 (LexisNexis 2009); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101 (2004 & Supp.
2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.101 (West 2011) (amended 2013); MONT. CODE ANN.
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several high-profile mass shootings.5
In the wake of these tragedies, discussion has often centered on the
topic of so-called “gun-free zones”—places where persons other than
sworn law enforcement officers are prohibited from carrying firearms,
even if they are law-abiding adults and possess a concealed-weapons
§ 45-8-321 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2430 (Reissue 2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 202.3657 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:6 (LexisNexis
2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4 (2004 & Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
415.11 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1–04–03 (2010) (amended 2013); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125 (West 2006) (amended 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1290.12 (2003 & Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.291 (2011); 18 PA.  STAT.
ANN. § 6109 (West 2000 & West Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-215 (2007 &
Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351
(2010); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.177 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704
(LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.070
(2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-4 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.60
(West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104 (2013).
Vermont allows unlicensed concealed carry, and so do Alaska, Arizona, and Wyo-
ming (in addition to their shall-issue permitting regimes). WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
8-104(a)(iv) (2013) (exempting from concealed weapons prohibition persons who
lack a permit but otherwise meet requirements for lawful possession). Cf. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4003 & 4004 (West 2007) (prohibiting the carry of a danger-
ous or deadly weapon only when it is carried “with the intent or avowed purpose
of injuring a fellow man” or in certain locations); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.61.190–11.61.210 (2010) (criminalizing the carry of firearms only in narrow
circumstances); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (2010) (same).  Additionally,
while Connecticut is a “may issue” state that gives its licensing authority a mea-
sure of discretion, its licensing authority has voluntarily adopted a permissive
issuance policy. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-28a (West 2009); Right to Carry,
NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, 2012, http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/articles/2012/right-to-
carry-2012.aspx (observing that, at the time of publication, there were forty-one
“right-to-carry” states and noting that “[i]n addition to the ‘shall issue’ states,”
Connecticut has a “fairly-administered discretionary-issue carry permit sys-
tem[ ]”) (last visited Mar. 4, 2013); Shall-Issue, May-Issue, No-Issue, and Un-
restricted States, BUCKEYE FIREARMS ASS’N, http://www.buckeyefirearms.org/
node/6744 (“Within the range and scope of ‘may issue’ states,” Connecticut is “as
forthcoming with the issuance of permits and licenses as to be practically ‘shall
issue.’”) (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  Therefore, the number of U.S. jurisdictions
with liberalized concealed carry regimes comes in at forty-two.
5. The highest profile mass shootings since 1999 have been Columbine (1999—13
murdered), Virginia Tech (2007—32 murdered), Fort Hood (2009—13 murdered),
Tucson (2011—6 murdered), Aurora (2012—12 murdered), and Sandy Hook Ele-
mentary (2012—27 murdered).  According to the commonly accepted definition of
“mass shooting,” which encompasses shootings in which four or more people are
murdered, there have been numerous others in the past decade. Newtown, Conn.
Shooting: Timeline of Mass Killings Since Columbine, NEWSMAX (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.newsmax.com/US/mass-shootings-us-colorado/2012/07/20/id/445971;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SERIAL MURDER: MUL-
TIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES FOR INVESTIGATORS 8 (Robert J. Morton, 2008),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/serial-murder/serial-
murder-july-2008-pdf (“Generally, mass murder was described as a number of
murders (four or more) occurring during the same incident, with no distinctive
time period between the murders.”) (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
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permit.6  Supporters of gun-free zones argue that certain locations are
especially sensitive, either because of the people or the activities they
host, and that allowing the general public to carry firearms in those
locations would cause an especially great threat to public safety.7
Gun-rights proponents take exactly the opposite view, contending that
gun-free zones actually attract violent crime (and especially mass kill-
ings) because violent criminals and grievance killers are undeterred
by laws forbidding the carry of firearms and prefer unarmed targets
when looking to carry out their sinister plots.8  The pro-carry move-
ment has gained traction in several states, leading to the legalization
of concealed carry on college campuses and by teachers and adminis-
trators in primary and secondary schools.9
When the Supreme Court invalidated Washington, D.C.’s restric-
tive gun laws six years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller,10 it sig-
naled an intention to leave at least a portion of the debate over gun-
free zones to the political process.  In a now familiar passage, the
Court stressed that while the Second Amendment confers an individ-
ual right to keep and bear arms, the Court’s decision should not “be
taken to cast doubt on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings . . . .”11  The
Court strongly suggested that the right to bear arms extends beyond
6. Even states with liberalized carry laws often prohibit those outside law enforce-
ment from carrying firearms in certain locations, such as primary and secondary
schools, university campuses, sports stadiums, courthouses, bars, and police sta-
tions.  For a compilation of such laws, see HANDGUNLAW.US, http://www.handgun
law.us/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
7. See, e.g., Brian Malte, Keep Guns Off College Campuses! Brady Campaign to Pre-
vent Gun Violence, http://www.bradynetwork.org/site/MessageViewer/?em_id=
46081.0&pgwrap=n ](“Introducing guns into a volatile environment where binge
drinking and drug use are all too prevalent would dramatically increase the risks
of suicide, gun thefts, and the number of gun violence victims.”) (last visited Aug.
15, 2013).
8. See, e.g., STUDENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY, http://concealedcampus.org/about/
(“Recent high-profile shootings and armed abductions on college campuses clearly
demonstrate that ‘gun free zones’ serve to disarm only those law-abiding citizens
who might otherwise be able to protect themselves.”) (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
9. See Guns on Campus: Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.
org/issues-research/educ/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx  (“Due to recent state
legislation and court rulings, 5 states now have provisions allowing the carrying
of concealed weapons on public postsecondary campuses.  These states are Colo-
rado, Mississippi, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin.”) (last visited Mar. 5, 2013);
John Roberts, States Mull Whether Arming Teachers Can Prevent Another School
Massacre, FOX NEWS, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/30/
states-mull-whether-arming-teachers-will-prevent-another-school-massacre/ (de-
tailing legislative proposals in thirteen states that would allow teachers and ad-
ministrators with concealed carry permits and additional training to carry
firearms in schools and reporting that two school districts in Texas now allow
trained teachers to carry concealed weapons) (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
10. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
11. Id. at 626–27.
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the home,12 but it nevertheless reaffirmed the presumptive validity of
gun-free zones in “sensitive places” two years later when it incorpo-
rated the Second Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago.13
The Court’s brief references to gun-free zones remain somewhat of
a mystery.  In neither Heller nor McDonald did the Court offer much
explanation for its dicta, aside from the casual observations that gun-
free zones in certain places are “longstanding” and have “historical
justifications.”14  Perhaps the strongest clue lies in the decisional
method of both opinions, which focused almost entirely on how the
public likely understood the Second and Fourteenth Amendments
when they were ratified in 1791 and 1868.15  To date, however, the
Supreme Court has offered no further guidance on the precise scope of
the right to keep and bear arms, and lower courts have begun to fill
the void.16
This Article focuses on Heller’s enumerated sensitive places—
“schools” and “government buildings”—and begins with the premise
that these terms allow some room for interpretation.  In affirming the
likely constitutionality of laws prohibiting the carrying of firearms in
schools, did the Court intend to leave undisturbed gun bans in pri-
mary and secondary schools only or also on university campuses?  In
its reference to government buildings, did the Court mean to suggest
that the government may act with impunity whenever it bans the
carry of firearms on its property, or are there some types of public
property—particularly national parks and remote lands home to dan-
gerous wildlife—where a combination of low security risks and histori-
cal practices limits the government’s authority as property owner?
This Article further assumes that the historical record will not
fully resolve these interpretive issues.  Indeed, as several commenta-
tors have noted, the historical pedigree of even Heller’s most noncon-
troversial “presumptively lawful” regulations—“prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons”17—can fairly be disputed.18  Perhaps
12. See discussion infra sections II.C., III.C.
13. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality opinion).
This passage actually appears in a portion of Justice Alito’s opinion commanding
the support of a four-Justice plurality, but since Justice Thomas did not address
the issue in his concurrence, there is no reason to doubt that Heller’s presump-
tively lawful regulations still enjoy the endorsement of a majority of the Court.
See discussion infra section II.B.
14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 635; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion).
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part III.
17. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
18. See, e.g., C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (2009) (concluding that the current federal ban on the pos-
session of firearms by all felons is much broader in scope than its historical ana-
logues); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 273 (2009) (“[T]he Court does not explain why [Heller’s
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Heller’s reference to the longstanding nature of certain presumptively
constitutional gun laws was meant to convey the notion that when the
American people reach a wide and longstanding consensus on the pro-
priety of a given legislative solution, their judgment is entitled to
great deference, even if their consensus occurs after the ratification of
the relevant constitutional provision.19  This Article offers no specula-
tion as to how long such a consensus must exist to be considered long-
standing and, recognizing also that originalism’s historical inquiry
has its limits,20 proceeds on the assumption that lower courts will
need to look to established constitutional doctrines from other areas of
law for additional guidance.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that lessons from First Amend-
ment doctrine counsel in favor of a narrow interpretation of Heller’s
schools and government buildings.  Part II summarizes the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald and describes how they
strongly imply a robust right to armed self-defense outside the home.
Part III surveys how the lower federal courts have begun to develop
Second Amendment doctrine after Heller and McDonald, focusing on
the different treatment they have given to Heller’s presumptively
valid regulations and the right to bear arms outside the home.  Part
IV focuses on those courts that have classified Heller’s presumptively
valid regulations as categorical Second Amendment exceptions, argu-
ing that while this analogy to First Amendment unprotected speech
carries some intuitive force, an expansive view of Heller’s exceptions
threatens to swallow Heller’s general rule in favor of armed self-de-
fense.  In the First Amendment context, categories of speech that re-
ceive no constitutional protection have been kept to a very small
presumptively valid] restrictions are embedded in the Second Amendment.  The
Constitution’s text, at least, has as little to say about restrictions on firearm own-
ership by felons as it does about the trimesters of pregnancy.”) (footnote omitted).
19. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(“[S]tatutory prohibitions on the possession of weapons by some persons are
proper—and, importantly for current purposes . . . the legislative role did not end
in 1791.  That some categorical limits are proper is part of the original meaning,
leaving to the people’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”).
20. Professor Nelson Lund has observed that “[t]he serious challenges for originalism
involve questions about its limits as a tool for adjudication” and has described
originalism’s “three main difficulties” as follows:
First, it is sometimes hard to find adequate objective evidence of how the
Constitution’s text would have been understood by the relevant audience
at the time of adoption.  Second, it is sometimes difficult to know how the
commands in the text should be applied, consistent with its original
meaning, to particular circumstances that the enacting public did not
consider, and often could not have foreseen.  Third, courts will inevitably
make some decisions based on mistaken interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, and later courts will have to decide how much deference to give
these precedents.
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2009).
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number of well-defined exceptions in an effort to preserve the broad
scope of the guarantee as it was understood by the ratifying public.  It
should be the same with Heller’s sensitive places exception to the Sec-
ond Amendment right of armed self-defense outside the home.
Finally, Part V demonstrates how broad themes from existing First
Amendment doctrines support a restrained interpretation of even Hel-
ler’s enumerated sensitive places—schools and government buildings.
Specifically, Part V argues that student speech cases observe a line
between the First Amendment rights of secondary and post-secondary
students, and these cases indicate that college campuses generally are
less sensitive than primary and secondary school classrooms.  Courts
therefore should not interpret Heller’s schools to encompass college
campuses.  Furthermore, Part V argues that, as with First Amend-
ment forum doctrine, the scope of the government’s authority to regu-
late the carry of firearms on its property should depend on the
character of the property at issue, and just as some government prop-
erty has historically hosted public assembly and debate, some govern-
ment properties—particularly national parks and remote lands home
to dangerous wildlife—have historically accommodated an armed citi-
zenry.  Courts therefore should not interpret Heller to stand for the
sweeping proposition that the government may act with impunity
whenever it bans the carry of firearms on its property.  In sum, Part V
concludes that courts should subject broad gun bans on university
campuses, national parks, and remote public lands to some form of
heightened scrutiny, rather than regard them as burdening conduct
that is categorically unprotected under the Second Amendment.
II. HELLER, McDONALD, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
OUTSIDE THE HOME
This Part describes why Heller and McDonald strongly imply a ro-
bust right to armed self-defense that extends outside the home to
many public places.  A brief review of both decisions is necessary to
explain this extension.
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: A Brief Review
In District of Columbia v. Heller,21 the Supreme Court undertook
its first thorough examination of the Second Amendment in modern
history.22  The Court in Heller confronted a challenge to Washington,
21. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
22. Before Heller, the Court’s most recent examination of the Second Amendment
had occurred in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).  In a somewhat enig-
matic opinion, the Miller Court reversed a district court’s demurrer of an indict-
ment that charged two defendants with transporting an unregistered short-
barreled shotgun in interstate commerce.  The Court reasoned that the Second
Amendment protects only those arms that have “some reasonable relationship to
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D.C.’s gun laws, which effectively banned the possession of all hand-
guns and operable firearms in the home.23  The challenge required the
Court to decide whether the Second Amendment guarantees an indi-
vidual right to keep and bear arms or rather only a collective right tied
to militia service.24  Prior to the Court’s decision, the U.S. courts of
appeal, in line with the prevailing view among academics, had largely
rejected the individual-right interpretation and had embraced the col-
lective-right model.25  Only the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit (in
the decision below) had held that the Second Amendment guarantees
an individual right unconnected to service in a militia.26
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the collective right
theory and struck down the challenged gun laws as violative of the
Second Amendment.  The Court held that the Second Amendment
secures an individual right to keep and bear arms that does not de-
pend on militia service and that, at its core, the Second Amendment
guarantees “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms
in defense of hearth and home.”27
The Court began by dividing the Amendment into its prefatory and
operative clauses.28  In its textual analysis of the operative clause, the
Court observed that in every other instance in the Constitution, the
phrase “right of the people” referred unambiguously to an individ-
ual—not collective—right.29  Furthermore, the Court observed that
the term “the people” “unambiguously refers to all members of the po-
litical community,” and the Second Amendment right, therefore, “be-
longs to all Americans,” not merely to those who serve in a militia.30
As to the phrase “keep and bear Arms,” the Court noted that “the
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” and at the time of ratifi-
cation, those serving in militias were expected to supply themselves with arms “of
the kind in common use at the time.” Id. at 178, 179.  For a detailed discussion of
Miller’s procedural history and precedential value, see Nelson Lund, Heller and
Second Amendment Precedent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 336–39 (2009).
23. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75.
24. Id. at 577.
25. Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); Gillespie v. City of Indianapo-
lis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v. Peper-
sack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st
Cir. 1942).
26. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v.
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
27. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
28. That is, respectively, (1) “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State”; and (2) “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II; Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
29. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579.
30. Id. at 580–81.
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18th-Century meaning [of ‘Arms’] is no different from the meaning to-
day,” and the Amendment protects modern-day weapons just as the
First Amendment protects modern forms of communication.31  The
Court then thoroughly examined an array of colonial and founding-era
sources indicating that the phrase “keep arms” meant “have weap-
ons,” and the phrase “bear arms” meant to carry weapons for either
offensive or defensive use.32  Notably, the Court found that when the
Bill of Rights was ratified, both phrases often referred to the posses-
sion and carry of weapons outside of an organized militia.33
Putting the operative clause’s textual elements together, the Court
determined that the Amendment guarantees “the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” and observed
that this interpretation “is strongly confirmed by the historical back-
ground of the Second Amendment.”34  The Court again surveyed a lit-
any of seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and early nineteenth-century
sources supporting the conclusion that, at the time of its ratification,
the public understood the Second Amendment to protect an individual
right to bear arms for self-defense.35  The Court noted, however, that
“[o]f course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s
right of free speech was not.”36  Thus, the Court declined to “read the
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for
any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment
to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”37
Turning to the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause, the Court
noted that, at the time of the founding, the “militia” consisted of all
able-bodied men.38  The Court rejected the government’s argument
that the militia identified in the Amendment was the organized mili-
tia—a military body created by Congress or the States.39  Rather, the
Court observed, the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause addressed
the general militia, whose existence pre-dated the Constitution’s rati-
fication.40  The Court found textual support for this interpretation in
Article I’s grants of power to Congress to “provide for calling forth”
and to “organiz[e]” the militia.41  These grants of power assumed the
pre-existence of their object, in contrast to Congress’s grants of power
to “raise . . . Armies” and “provide . . . a Navy,” which were powers to
31. Id. at 581–82.
32. Id. at 582–84.
33. Id. at 582–92.
34. Id. at 592.
35. Id. at 592–95.
36. Id. at 595.
37. Id.
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create.42  As for the adjective “well-regulated,” the Court found it to
imply “nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and
training.”43  The Court then briefly examined the phrase “security of a
free State,” observing that it was a “term[ ] of art in 18th-Century po-
litical discourse, meaning a ‘free country’ or free polity.”44  A well-reg-
ulated militia was thought “necessary to the security of a free state,”
the Court observed, because it could repel invasions, suppress insur-
rections, eliminate the need for standing armies, and resist domestic
tyranny.45
Putting the Second Amendment’s prefatory and operative clauses
together, the Court noted that they complement each other perfectly
since the founding generation knew that past tyrants had eliminated
militias by disarming the citizenry.46  The Court observed that during
the 1788 ratification debates, Antifederalists feared that a powerful
federal government would disarm the people and impose tyrannical
rule by a standing army.47  At the same time, the Court cautioned
that just because the founding generation codified the right to bear
arms for the main purpose of preventing the elimination of the militia
did not mean that the right to bear arms was limited to militia ser-
vice.48  Numerous historical sources confirmed that, for the founding
generation, self-defense “was the central component of the right itself,”
even if it was not the main purpose for the right’s codification in the
Constitution.49
Having made its case for interpreting the Second Amendment to
protect an individual right, the Court turned to founding-era ana-
logues in state constitutions and post-ratification commentary, case
law, and legislation.  The Court found that these sources overwhelm-
ingly confirmed that the Court’s understanding of the Amendment
comported with that of the American public at the time of ratification
and well into the 19th-Century.50
Before its analysis of the challenged D.C. gun laws, the Court
paused to stress the narrowness of its decision.  In a now familiar pas-
sage, the Court declared:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlim-
ited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and
courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.  For
42. Id.
43. Id. at 597.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 598.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 599.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 600–19.
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example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held
that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Sec-
ond Amendment or state analogues. Although we do not undertake an exhaus-
tive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment,
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibi-
tions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws for-
bidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.51
The Court explained that “[w]e identify these presumptively lawful
regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be
exhaustive.”52
The Court then finally turned its attention to Washington, D.C.’s
complete ban on the possession of handguns and operable firearms in
the home.  The Court noted that “the inherent right of self-defense has
been central to the Second Amendment right,” and the District’s hand-
gun ban “amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful pur-
pose.”53  Furthermore, the Court noted that the handgun ban ex-
tended to the home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute.”54  Such a sweeping measure would fail
“[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enu-
merated constitutional rights,” the Court opined, explicitly ruling out
rational basis review.55  The Court noted that the severity of D.C.’s
handgun ban knew almost no historical parallel, and it cited with ap-
proval state decisions that had invalidated prohibitions on carrying
pistols openly (though leaving intact bans on the concealed carry of
pistols).56  That the ban still allowed the possession of long guns
would not cure the constitutional infirmity—Americans consider the
handgun to be the “quintessential self-defense weapon,” and a com-
plete prohibition of “the most popular weapon chosen by Americans
51. Id. at 626–27 (footnote and internal citations omitted) (emphases added).  The
Court further opined:
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and
carry arms.  Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons
protected were those “in common use at the time.”  We think that limita-
tion is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the car-
rying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”
Id. at 627 (internal citation omitted).
52. Id. at 627 n.26.
53. Id. at 628.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 628–29 (footnote omitted).  The Court noted that “[i]f all that was required
to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second
Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on
irrational laws, and would have no effect.” Id. at 628 n.27.
56. Id. at 629 (citing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn.
(3 Hesik.) 165, 187 (1871)).
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for self-defense in the home . . . is invalid.”57  The Court was equally
unsympathetic to the District’s blanket prohibition against the in-
home possession of operable firearms, declaring it unconstitutional be-
cause it made it “impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the core
lawful purpose of self-defense.”58
The Court then made several parting observations in response to
Justice Breyer’s dissent, which had enlisted a compilation of colonial-
era gunpowder storage and firearms discharge regulations to advance
an argument in favor of the constitutionality of the District’s handgun
ban and which had also criticized the majority for declining to estab-
lish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment claims.  The
Court noted that Justice Breyer’s “fire-safety laws . . . do not remotely
burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on hand-
guns.”59  As to Justice Breyer’s “broad jurisprudential point,” the
Court defended its refusal to provide a detailed framework for analyz-
ing future Second Amendment claims and flatly rejected Justice
Breyer’s proposed “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry.’”60
The Court insisted that “[w]e know of no other enumerated constitu-
tional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding
‘interest-balancing’ approach,” remarking that “[c]onstitutional rights
are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the
people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even
future judges think that scope too broad.”61  The First Amendment’s
guarantee was understood by the ratifying public to contain excep-
tions for obscenity, libel, and espionage but not for the expression of
unpopular opinions.62  “The Second Amendment is no different,” the
Court concluded, “[a]nd whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, re-
sponsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”63  Fi-
nally, responding to Justice Breyer’s criticism of the Court for failing
to provide “extensive historical justification for those regulations of
the right that we describe as permissible,” the Court assured that
“there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifica-
tions for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those excep-
tions come before us.”64
57. Id.
58. Id. at 630.
59. Id. at 632.
60. Id. at 634.
61. Id. at 634–35.
62. Id. at 635
63. Id.
64. Id.
2014]HELLER’S SCHOOLS AND GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS 549
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago: A Brief Review
Having prevailed against the District of Columbia’s draconian fire-
arms laws, gun-rights proponents turned their gaze to the next logical
step for Second Amendment litigation: incorporation.  They set their
sights on Chicago, and they picked their target well.
Over 120 years beforehand, the Supreme Court had refused to in-
corporate the Second Amendment in Presser v. Illinois, a case which
involved a Chicago resident’s constitutional challenge to his conviction
under an Illinois law that generally prohibited groups of citizens from
“drill[ing] or parad[ing] with arms in any city or town of this state”
without a license from the governor.65  The Supreme Court upheld the
conviction on the grounds that the Second Amendment applied only to
the federal government, citing United States v. Cruikshank66 as the
main support for its decision.67 Presser and Cruikshank had been de-
cided in the wake of the Slaughter-House Cases and long before the
flowering of the Court’s modern selective incorporation doctrine, and
in their effort to overturn these stale decisions, gun-rights advocates
looked to Chicago once again, which had enacted a handgun ban
nearly identical to the one that the Court had invalidated in Heller.
Emboldened by their success in Heller, gun-rights proponents
achieved another victory at the Supreme Court.  In McDonald v. City
of Chicago,68 the Court invalidated Chicago’s near-total handgun ban
and held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amend-
ment right fully applicable against the States, effectively overruling
Presser and Cruikshank.69  A plurality opined that the Second Amend-
ment right was incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
65. 116 U.S. 252, 253 (1886).
66. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Cruikshank had similarly held that the Second Amendment
had no application to the States. Id. at 553.  Twelve years after Presser, the
Court repeated its conclusion that the Second Amendment was not incorporated.
Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
67. Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
68. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
69. McDonald did not technically overrule these decisions because they rested en-
tirely on the Slaughter-House Cases’ restrictive interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.  However, to the extent that
Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller stood for the general proposition that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not make the Second Amendment right applicable
against the states, McDonald may fairly be seen to have overruled them.  The
Seventh Circuit’s decision in McDonald, which refused to incorporate the Second
Amendment, had viewed them as controlling. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009) (“ ‘If a precedent of this Court
has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly
controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’”)
(quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989)).  The Supreme Court even agreed that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller
“doomed Petitioners’ claims at the Court of Appeals level.” McDonald, 130 S. Ct.
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Due Process Clause,70 while Justice Thomas saw the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause as the proper vehicle for incorporation.71  The end
result, however, was clear: Heller’s right to keep and bear arms ap-
plied fully to state and local governments, and lower courts would now
have to begin the arduous task of developing Second Amendment doc-
trine amidst a flurry of challenges to restrictive gun laws across the
country.
The Court in McDonald acknowledged that by the 1850s, the
American public—unlike the founding generation—no longer held a
widespread fear that the federal government would disarm the gen-
eral militia.72  Even so, the Court observed that “the right to keep and
bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense.”73  The
Court then argued that historical sources overwhelmingly confirm
that at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1868,
the American public deemed the right of armed self-defense to be
“fundamental.”74
The Court chronicled the attempted disarmament of Free-Soilers
in Bloody Kansas, as well as the systematic disarmament of blacks
during the period immediately following the Civil War.75  The Court
then recounted Congress’s legislative efforts to curb the violence per-
petrated against disarmed southern blacks, beginning with § 14 of the
Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, which provided that “the right . . . to
have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning per-
sonal liberty [and] personal security . . . including the constitutional
right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citi-
zens . . . without respect to race, or color, or previous condition of slav-
ery.”76  The Court noted that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
similarly sought to protect the right to keep and bear arms and that
“it is generally accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was under-
stood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting the rights set out
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”77  The Court also looked to the de-
bates leading up to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, evi-
dence from the period immediately following ratification, and the
overwhelming majority of state constitutions that protected a right to
at 3030.  For lower courts, then, McDonald effectively overruled these stale
decisions.
70. Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion).
71. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  For
an assessment of the relative merits of the plurality’s and Justice Thomas’s ap-
proaches, see Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (or Are There More?)
in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487 (2011).
72. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 3038–42.
75. Id. at 3038.
76. Id. at 3039–40.
77. Id. at 3040–41.
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keep and bear arms in 1868.78  These sources buttressed the Court’s
conclusion that “the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamen-
tal rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”79
Justice Alito, in a portion of his opinion that commanded the votes
of a four-Justice plurality, took pains to re-emphasize Heller’s assur-
ance that the right to keep and bear arms knows several limitations:
It is important to keep in mind that Heller, while striking down a law that
prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the right
to keep and bear arms is not “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatso-
ever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”  We made it clear
in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory
measures as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifi-
cations on the commercial sale of arms.” We repeat those assurances here.  De-
spite municipal respondents’ doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not
imperil every law regulating firearms.80
In his separate concurrence, Justice Thomas did not directly address
the issue, but neither did he give any reason to doubt his continued
support for Heller’s dictum.81 McDonald therefore preserved the
Court’s position that bans on the carry of firearms in sensitive places
are presumptively valid, but it shed no further light on the issue.  The
decision also followed Heller’s lead by declining to establish a stan-
dard of review for Second Amendment claims, thereby leaving the
task of doing so to lower courts in future challenges.
C. Why Heller and McDonald Strongly Imply a Robust Right
to Armed Self-Defense Outside the Home
While both Heller and McDonald confronted highly restrictive laws
that applied to the in-home possession of commonly used firearms,
they nevertheless strongly imply a robust right to armed self-defense
outside the home.  Most obviously, Heller acknowledged that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects two different rights—to “keep” and to “bear”
arms—and it specifically interpreted the latter as a right to “carry”
weapons.82  But Heller and McDonald also suggest that the Second
78. Id. at 3041–42.
79. Id. at 3042.
80. Id. at 3047 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
81. See id. at 3058–88 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
82. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582, 584, 592 (2008) (interpreting
“keep arms” to mean “have weapons” and “bear arms” to mean “carry” weapons,
and finding that the Second Amendment guarantees “the individual right to pos-
sess and carry weapons”) (emphases added). Heller reinforced the distinction by
rejecting Justice Breyer’s contention that “keep and bear Arms” was a term of art
that guaranteed only one right. Id. at 591; see also Drake v. Filko, No. 12-1150,
2013 WL 3927735, at *13 (3d Cir. July 31, 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (find-
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Amendment should not be confined to the home in three other ways.
First, Heller focused on how the ratifying public likely understood the
Second Amendment, referencing commentary and case law that point
unmistakably toward a right to carry firearms outside the home.  Sec-
ond, a reading of Heller that confines the right to carry a firearm to
the home renders its sensitive places passage superfluous.  Finally,
both Heller and McDonald strongly emphasized the centrality of self-
defense to the Second Amendment right, and the need for self-defense
is not—and never has been—confined to the home.
1. Heller’s Early American Commentary and Case Law
As the Seventh Circuit has observed, “[t]o speak of ‘bearing’ arms
within one’s home would at all times have been an awkward usage,”
and “one doesn’t have to be a historian to realize that a right to keep
and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth century
could not rationally have been limited to the home.”83  Indeed, the
very historical sources that Heller approvingly cited confirm that the
American public understood the Second Amendment to protect a right
to armed self-defense outside the home.  For example, in discussing
the original public meaning of “bear arms,” Heller partially relied on
Cecil Humphreys’s early nineteenth-century observation that “ ‘in this
country the constitution guaranties to all persons the right to bear
arms; then it can only be a crime to exercise this right in such a man-
ner, as to terrify people unnecessarily.’”84  This passage would make
little sense if the Second Amendment right were limited to the home;
if the right to bear arms did not extend past the home, then its exer-
cise could not possibly run the risk of “terrify[ing] people unnecessa-
rily.”  The Court’s approval of William Rawle’s observation in 1825
that the Second Amendment right “ought not ‘be abused to the distur-
bance of the public peace,’ such as by assembling with other armed
individuals ‘for an unlawful purpose,’”85 further underscores the
point.  Additionally, to decipher the original meaning of “bear arms,”
the Heller Court also relied on Justice James Wilson’s interpretation
ing that the Supreme Court has indicated that the Second Amendment extends
beyond the home because “Heller engaged in significant historical analysis on the
meaning of the text of the Second Amendment, specifically focusing on the words
‘keep’ and ‘bear’ as codifying distinct rights”); Drake, 2013 WL 3927735, at *13
(Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“To speak of ‘bearing’ arms solely within one’s home
not only would conflate ‘bearing’ with ‘keeping,’ in derogation of the Court’s hold-
ing that the verbs codified distinct rights, but also would be awkward usage given
the meaning assigned the terms by the Supreme Court.”).
83. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012).
84. Heller, 554 U.S. at 587–88 n.10 (2008) (quoting C. HUMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF
THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY 482 (1822)) (alteration omitted).
85. Id. at 607–08 (quoting W. Rawle, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 123 (1825)).
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of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Second Amendment analogue.  As
the Court acknowledged, Justice Wilson interpreted Pennsylvania’s
arms-bearing right as “a recognition of the natural right of defense ‘of
one’s person or house’—what he called the law of ‘self preservation.’”86
This passage explicitly made a distinction between the right to self-
defense in the home and the right to self-defense outside the home,
asserting that both were protected.
But perhaps most telling is Heller’s reliance on two antebellum
state court decisions that unequivocally interpreted the Second
Amendment to protect a right to bear arms outside the home.87  In
Nunn v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a near-total
prohibition on the carry of firearms in public, holding that the Second
Amendment protects a right to openly carry firearms.88  The Nunn
court opined that under the Second Amendment, the state could regu-
late the manner in which pistols were carried and thus could criminal-
ize the practice of carrying them in concealment, but the state could
not completely prohibit the carry of firearms for protection outside the
home.89  Similarly, in State v. Chandler, the Louisiana Supreme
Court upheld a prohibition on the concealed carry of weapons while
describing a person’s “right to carry arms . . . in full open view” as “the
right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.”90  In Hel-
ler, the Supreme Court cited both of these holdings with approval to
support its conclusion that the Second Amendment guarantees an in-
dividual right unconnected with militia service.91 Heller’s favorable
86. Id. at 585 (citing 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1142, &  n.x (Kermit L.
Hall & Mark Hall eds., 2007)) (emphasis added).
87. C.f. Drake v. Filko, No. 12-1150, 2013 WL 3927735, at *19 (3d Cir. July 31, 2013)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“The crux of these [state high-court decisions uphold-
ing concealed carry bans but striking down total carry bans], endorsed by the
Supreme Court [in Heller], is that a prohibition against both open and concealed
carry without a permit is different in kind, not merely in degree, from a prohibi-
tion covering only one type of carry.”).
88. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).  The Nunn court erroneously opined that the
Second Amendment applied to the States, notwithstanding the United States Su-
preme Court’s contrary holding in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250–51.
89. Id. at 249.  Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has stated in dicta that prohibitions
on concealed carry do not offend the Second Amendment. Robertson v. Baldwin,
165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897) (stating that “the right of the people to keep and bear
arms . . . is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons”).
90. State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Heller, 554 U.S. at 612–13.  The Court also approvingly cited several other state
court decisions that interpreted arms-bearing provisions in state constitutions to
guarantee a right to bear arms outside the home. Id. at 585 n.9 (citing State v.
Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–17 (1840) (upholding a statute that prohibited the carrying
of concealed weapons but allowed the open carry of weapons, finding that the
legislature may regulate the manner in which arms are carried as long as it
leaves intact the right to armed self-defense); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2
Litt.) 90, 91–92 (1822) (invalidating a statute that prohibited the carrying of con-
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citations of these holdings, coupled with its reliance on the commen-
tary of Cecil Humphreys, William Rawle, and Justice Wilson, strongly
suggest the Court’s willingness to recognize a right to carry firearms
outside the home for the purpose of self-defense.
2. Heller’s “Sensitive Places” Passage
In addition to the legal sources upon which Heller relied to deci-
pher the original public meaning of the Second Amendment, Heller’s
sensitive places passage itself strongly suggests a right to bear arms
outside the home.92  If the right to bear arms does not extend beyond
the home, then the Court simply could have said so and would then
have had no need to reassure the District of Columbia that it could
ban the carry of firearms in sensitive places.  That a location’s sensi-
tivity has any bearing at all on the constitutional analysis seems to
rule out the possibility that the Court meant to confine the Second
Amendment to the home. Heller’s sensitive places passage strongly
implies that in the developing landscape of Second Amendment juris-
prudence, prohibitions on the carry of firearms in public should be the
exception, not the rule.  Any other interpretation of Heller would
render unnecessary the specificity with which it reassured the District
of Columbia regarding its bans on the carry of firearms in sensitive
places.
3. Heller’s and McDonald’s Strong Emphasis on Self-Defense
Finally, in both Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court implied
that the right to bear arms extends beyond the home by its repeated
emphases on the centrality of self-defense to the Second Amendment
right.  In Heller, the Court recognized that colonial Americans under-
stood the pre-existing, natural “right of self-preservation” to permit a
citizen to “ ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in
his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.’”93 Heller also made
clear that this pre-existing right was codified in the Second Amend-
ment.94  In fact, the Heller Court called self-defense “the central com-
cealed weapons)); id. at 629 (citing Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 165, 187
(1871) (striking down a sweeping prohibition on openly carrying a pistol “publicly
or privately, without regard to time or place, or circumstances”)).
92. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir.) (Niemeyer, J.,
writing separately), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011) (“If the Second Amend-
ment right were confined to self-defense in the home, the Court would not have
needed to express a reservation for ‘sensitive places’ outside of the home.”); Drake
v. Filko, No. 12-1150, 2013 WL 3927735, at *14 (3d Cir. July 31, 2013)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Judge Niemeyer).
93. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 145–46
n.42 (1803)).
94. Id. at 599–600.
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ponent of the [Second Amendment] right itself,”95 observing that
commentators such as St. George Tucker—presumably alongside the
early American public at-large—equated the right to self-defense with
the Second Amendment.96  In McDonald, the Court repeated these ob-
servations, finding that “[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by
many legal systems from ancient times to the present day,” and,
therefore, the Second Amendment right is “deeply rooted in this Na-
tion’s history and tradition.”97
Clearly, the need for self-defense is not—and never has been—con-
fined to the home, and both Heller and McDonald implicitly acknowl-
edged this fact. Heller recognized the need for self-defense outside the
home when it observed that the District’s handgun ban extended “to
the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is
most acute.”98  If the need for self-defense is “most acute” in the home,
then presumably there must be some other places outside the home
where it is also “acute.”99  Similarly, Heller stated that “[the Second
Amendment’s operative clause] guarantee[s] the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”100  Nowhere did
the Court suggest that confrontations requiring access to a means of
95. Id. at 599.
96. Id. at 606.
97. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Drake v. Filko, No. 12-1150, 2013 WL 3927735, at *14
(3d Cir. July 31, 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (noting that “the McDonald
Court described the holding in Heller as encompassing a general right to self-
defense,” and the broad manner in which McDonald described Heller’s holding
“demonstrates that the legal principle enunciated in Heller is not confined to the
facts presented in [Heller]”).
98. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added).
99. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Both Heller and
McDonald do say that ‘the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute’ in the home, but that doesn’t mean it is not acute outside the home.  Heller
repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than the right to have a
gun in one’s home, as when it says that the amendment ‘guarantee[s] the individ-
ual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.’  Confrontations
are not limited to the home.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Mas-
ciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir.) (Niemeyer, J., writing separately), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011) (reading Heller to suggest “that some form of the
right [to possess firearms for self-defense] applies where that need is not ‘most
acute’”); Drake, 2013 WL 3927735, at *13 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the Seventh Circuit and Judge Niemeyer because “[w]ere it otherwise, there
would be no need for the modifier ‘most,’” and “[t]his reasoning is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms
as ‘an individual right protecting against both public and private violence’”)
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 594).
100. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added); see also Moore, 702 F.3d at 935–36
(noting that “Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than
the right to have a gun in one’s home, as when it says that the amendment ‘guar-
antee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.’”).
556 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:537
self-defense occur only within the home, and for good reason: such a
statement would border on the ridiculous.101
McDonald underscored the need for self-defense outside the home
by its extensive discussion of the systematic disarmament of—and
subsequent violence against—southern blacks shortly after the Civil
War.  To provide support for the proposition that the ratifying public
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to make the right to keep and
bear arms applicable against the states, McDonald alluded to several
instances in which disarmed blacks were tortured and killed outside
their homes.102  It would have been a cruel trick for the Fourteenth
Amendment to have guaranteed freedmen the right to bear arms only
when inside their homes, while corrupt state officials, ex-Confederate
soldiers, and Klansmen patrolled the streets outside and waited for
them to emerge unarmed.  Fortunately, nothing in the Court’s opinion
in McDonald suggests that was the case, and its extensive discussion
of the plight of freedmen during Reconstruction highlights the need
for a robust right to armed self-defense outside the home.
III. TERRA INCOGNITA AND EMERGING SECOND
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE IN THE LOWER COURTS
Heller and McDonald answered the fundamental questions—
whether the Second Amendment secures an individual right and
whether that right is enforceable against the states—but they left to
lower courts the arduous task of developing a detailed analytical
framework for Second Amendment claims.  The Court did not, how-
ever, send them out to explore this vast terra incognita without a map
or compass.103  The Court’s opinions, by focusing on how the American
101. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME VIC-
TIMIZATION SURVEY FOR 2004–08, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?
ty=tp&tid=44 (reporting that from 2004 to 2008, only 33.7% of violent crimes oc-
curred in or near the home of the victim) (last visited Mar. 10, 2013); Drake, 2013
WL 3927735, at *13, *15 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“Obviously, confrontations
and conflicts ‘are not limited to the home.’ . . .  Because the need for self-defense
naturally exists both outside and inside the home, I would hold that the Second
Amendment applies outside the home.”) (quoting Moore, 702 F.3d at 936).
102. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038–42 (2010); see also id. at
3080–83, 3087–88 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (providing more detail and emphasizing that blacks routinely suffered vio-
lence in the North, as well).
103. See discussion supra section II.C. But see, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638
F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011) (“This case under-
scores the dilemma faced by lower courts in the post-Heller world: how far to
push Heller beyond its undisputed core holding. . . . There may or may not be a
Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home, but we have no idea
what those places are, what the criteria for selecting them should be, what slid-
ing scales of scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other ques-
tions.”) (internal citations omitted).
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public likely understood the Second and Fourteenth Amendments
upon ratification, indicate that courts in future challenges should sim-
ilarly focus their attention on the public’s understanding of the right
to keep and bear arms in 1791 and 1868. Heller also makes clear that
the Second Amendment has a limited scope104 and that even within
the range of activities protected by the Second Amendment, some ac-
tivities—such as a law-abiding citizen’s possession of a pistol for self-
defense in the home—fall more closely to its center than others.105
Similarly, Heller recognized that some regulations burden the right to
keep and bear arms more than others, and the Second Amendment
may set a lower hurdle for less burdensome regulations.106  At the
same time, the Court explicitly ruled out rational basis review for laws
that burden Second Amendment rights.107  Finally, Heller provided a
non-exhaustive list of several types of gun laws that will presumably
survive a Second Amendment challenge.108
104. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Sec-
ond Amendment is not unlimited.  From Blackstone through the 19th-Century
cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right
to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose.”); id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to pro-
tect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do
not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any
purpose.”); id. at 625 (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect those weapons
not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-
barreled shotguns.  That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of
the right.”) (emphasis added); id. at 634–35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined
with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them,
whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too
broad. . . . The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that
the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure
of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-
headed views.  The Second Amendment is no different.”).
105. See id. at 599 (declaring that self-defense “was the central component of the [right
to keep and bear arms] itself”); id. at 628–29 (striking down the District of Co-
lumbia’s handgun ban because “the inherent right of self-defense has been cen-
tral to the Second Amendment right.  The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition
of an entire class of arms that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for
that lawful purpose.  The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the
need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
106. See, e.g., id. at 632 (observing that the gunpowder storage laws Justice Breyer
cited in his dissent “do not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as
an absolute ban on handguns” and asserting that the Court’s analysis does not
“suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent
accidents”).
107. Id. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear
arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no
effect.”).
108. See id. at 626–27 &  n.26; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047
(2010) (plurality opinion).
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Armed with these tools, the federal courts of appeals have already
filled in many of the gaps left by Heller and McDonald and have even
reached a widespread consensus on the general framework that courts
should follow when analyzing claims founded on the right to keep and
bear arms.  Even so, courts that apply this general framework disa-
gree on two key issues.  First, courts diverge in their treatment of Hel-
ler’s “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”  Second, courts
following the majority approach also disagree on whether—and if so,
to what extent—the right to bear arms extends beyond the home.
A. Two-Step Analysis: Scope and Scrutiny
The overwhelming majority of federal courts of appeals that have
entertained post-Heller Second Amendment claims have adopted a
two-step approach for analyzing such claims.109  According to the ma-
jority approach, courts will ask whether the challenged statute im-
poses a burden on conduct that falls within the Second Amendment’s
guarantee.  If it does not, the statute is constitutional.  If the statute
does burden conduct that the Second Amendment protects, however,
courts will ask whether it passes muster under the appropriate level
of heightened review.110  For cases that advance to this second step,
109. Judge Brett Kavanaugh has proposed, and Judge Jennifer Elrod has endorsed,
an alternative one-step approach that omits a “levels of scrutiny” analysis and
focuses solely on constitutional text, history, and tradition. See Heller v. District
of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271–85 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissent-
ing); Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 451–52 (5th Cir.) (Elrod, J.,
dissenting), majority opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 682 F.3d 361
(5th Cir. 2012).  This alternative approach appears more consistent with Heller’s
rejection of “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquir[ies].’ ” See Heller, 554
U.S. at 634–35; Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Sev-
enth Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013).
However, because the text-history-tradition approach has not gained a foothold
in the federal courts of appeals, this Article proceeds using the majority two-step
approach.
110. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Ex-
plosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia,
687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 856 (2013);
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 375
(2012);  Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell
v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester,
628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011); United States v. Marz-
zarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011).
Just before this issue went to print, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit an-
nounced that it would follow the majority two-step approach except when con-
fronted with a complete prohibition of the core right to armed self-defense.  When
government prohibits nearly all “typical responsible, law-abiding citizen[s]” from
exercising the core right to armed self-defense, the Ninth Circuit will decline to
apply any form of scrutiny and will simply declare the prohibition invalid per se.
See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014).
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courts will select a level of scrutiny greater than rational basis re-
view—usually something approximating either intermediate or strict
scrutiny—based on how close the burdened right comes to the core of
the Second Amendment’s guarantee and how severely the challenged
statute burdens that right.111
The first federal court of appeals decision to articulate this bifur-
cated approach was the Seventh Circuit’s now-vacated decision in
United States v. Skoien.112  In an opinion by Judge Diane Sykes, a
panel of the Seventh Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits convicted domestic violence misde-
meanants from possessing firearms.  The defendant had moved to dis-
miss his indictment, arguing that prosecuting him under § 922(g)(9)
violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms for hunting.113
The government defended the indictment merely by referencing Hel-
ler’s intention to leave intact “longstanding prohibitions on the posses-
sion of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”114  Judge Sykes
rejected the government’s superficial analogy to Heller’s “longstanding
prohibitions,” observing that Heller’s “reference to exceptions cannot
be read to relieve the government of its burden of justifying laws that
restrict Second Amendment rights.”115
Judge Sykes began her analysis with an examination of Heller.
She observed that Heller’s reference to exceptions could have been in-
tended to mean that certain gun laws are valid because they burden
conduct that “fall[s] outside the scope of the Second Amendment right
as it was understood at the time of the framing,” or rather because
“they are presumptively lawful under even the highest standard of
scrutiny applicable to laws that encumber constitutional rights.”116
Without resolving that question directly, Judge Sykes interpreted Hel-
ler to “establish[ ] the following general approach” to claims founded
on the right to keep and bear arms:
First, some gun laws will be valid because they regulate conduct that falls
outside the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights
was ratified.  If the government can establish this, then the analysis need go
no further.  If, however, a law regulates conduct falling within the scope of the
right, then the law will be valid (or not) depending on the government’s ability
to satisfy whatever level of means-end scrutiny is held to apply; the degree of
fit required between the means and the end will depend on how closely the
law comes to the core of the right and the severity of the law’s burden on the
right. . . . If the first inquiry into the founding-era scope of the right doesn’t
111. See sources cited supra note 110.
112. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 614 F.3d
638 (7th Cir. 2010).
113. Id. at 805.
114. Id. at 808 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
115. Id. at 805.
116. Id. at 808.
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resolve the case, then the second inquiry into the law’s contemporary means-
end justification is required.117
Applying this general approach, Judge Sykes noted that the first
inquiry didn’t yield a conclusive answer as to whether domestic vio-
lence misdemeanants fall outside the scope of the Second Amend-
ment’s guarantee as the founding generation originally understood it.
But since the government had not argued the point, Judge Sykes pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the defendant’s Second Amendment
rights were intact.118  Turning to the second inquiry, Judge Sykes se-
lected intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for the
case.  She noted that “strict scrutiny cannot apply across the board” to
all Second Amendment claims, given “Heller’s dicta about ‘presump-
tively lawful’ firearms laws.”119  Because the defendant was a con-
victed domestic violence misdemeanant claiming a right to bear arms
only for hunting purposes, Judge Sykes noted that the case presented
a claim that was “several steps removed from the core constitutional
right identified in Heller,” to wit, the right of “law-abiding, responsible
citizens” to bear arms for self-defense.120  Judge Sykes therefore held
that intermediate scrutiny provided the correct standard of review,
and she remanded the case to the district court, giving the govern-
ment an opportunity to discharge its burden on a more developed
record.121
Judge Sykes’s decision was later vacated when the Seventh Circuit
reheard the case en banc,122 but it nonetheless proved highly influen-
117. Id. at 808–09 (citing Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s
Future in the Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035 (2008); Nelson Lund, The
Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1343, 1372–75 (2009); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551,
1572–73 (2009)).
118. Id. at 810.
119. Id. at 811.  This suggests that Heller’s presumptively valid regulations are valid
because they pass scrutiny (rather than because they fall outside the scope of the
Second Amendment).
120. Id. at 812 (internal quotation marks omitted). See District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“[W]hatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to
future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”).
121. Skoien, 587 F.3d at 816.
122. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  The Court
held that just as First Amendment categorical exceptions have been expanded to
include child pornography (even though it fails the historical test for obscenity),
Heller’s categories of presumptively valid gun laws “are not restricted to those
recognized in 1791.” Id. at 641.  Even so, the court declined to rule whether do-
mestic violence misdemeanants fall completely outside the scope of the Second
Amendment’s guarantee, subjected § 922(g)(9) to intermediate scrutiny, and
found that it passes muster without any need for a more developed record. Id. at
641–45.
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tial.  Two weeks after the Seventh Circuit vacated Judge Sykes’s opin-
ion, the Third Circuit similarly found that Heller “suggests a two-
pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges.”123  Under the
Third Circuit’s test, courts must ask “whether the challenged law im-
poses a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second
Amendment’s guarantee,” and if it does, they must then evaluate the
law under some form of heightened review.124  For guidance in select-
ing the appropriate standard of review, the Third Circuit opined that
just as First Amendment claims receive a sliding scale of scrutiny, “de-
pending upon the type of law challenged and the type of speech at
issue,” the level of review for Second Amendment claims should simi-
larly hinge on the particular iteration of the right asserted and the
degree to which the challenged statute burdens that right.125  This
framework ultimately led the Third Circuit to uphold, under an inter-
mediate scrutiny test, the federal ban on the possession of firearms
with obliterated serial numbers.126
Judge Sykes’s and the Third Circuit’s two-prong test, or a substan-
tially similar one, has been adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Sev-
enth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits.127
Additionally, just before this issue went to print, a divided panel of the
Ninth Circuit announced that it will follow the scope–scrutiny ap-
proach in most Second Amendment cases, but it will omit the scrutiny
step in favor of “Heller-style per se invalidation” when confronted with
a complete prohibition of the core right to armed self-defense.128  The
lower federal courts have therefore widely settled on the two-step
It should also be noted that Judge Sykes, in a later case, wrote for a panel of
the Seventh Circuit and formally adopted the scope–scrutiny two-step approach.
See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700–04 (7th Cir. 2011).
123. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 958 (2011).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 96–97.
126. Id. at 98–99.
127. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explo-
sives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687
F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 856 (2013); United
States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 375 (2012);
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City
of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011).
128. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014) (declining
to apply any form of scrutiny when government prohibits nearly all “typical re-
sponsible, law-abiding citizen[s]” from exercising the core right to armed self-
defense).
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scope–scrutiny method for evaluating most claims founded on the Sec-
ond Amendment right to keep and bear arms.129
B. Differing Treatment of Heller’s Longstanding,
Presumptively Lawful Regulations
While most of the federal circuits have settled on a bifurcated
scope–scrutiny framework for dealing with Second Amendment chal-
lenges, they disagree on where to place Heller’s “presumptively lawful
regulatory measures” on that framework.  Some circuits treat them as
categorical exceptions that either presumptively or conclusively bur-
den conduct that falls completely outside the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protections.130  Such courts draw an analogy to catego-
ries of speech that receive no First Amendment protection, such as
obscenity and incitement, and find it unnecessary to subject Heller’s
presumptively valid laws to any form of review.  Other circuits have
instead opted to regard Heller’s presumptively valid regulations as
burdens on conduct that is protected by the Second Amendment but
which presumptively pass muster in a facial attack.131  This is not an
inconsequential distinction, because as-applied challenges to Heller’s
exceptions can theoretically succeed in courts that adopt the latter
approach.
Both approaches have considerable merit.  Courts adopting the
first approach observe that Heller repeatedly stressed the limited
129. But see, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166–68 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 838 (2013) (reserving heightened scrutiny only for laws that
“substantially burden” the exercise of Second Amendment rights).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958
(2011).  In a small but not insignificant variation of the Eighth and Third Cir-
cuits’ approach, the District of Columbia and Fifth Circuits have treated Heller’s
exceptions as regulations that, due to their “longstanding” public acceptance, are
“presumed not to burden conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment.”
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (emphasis
added); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 700 F.3d at 196–97 (adopting the D.C.
Circuit’s formulation).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 678–80 (4th Cir. 2010) (contrast-
ing Heller’s “dangerous and unusual weapons” exception, which refers to arms
that are completely outside the scope of the Second Amendment, with Heller’s
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” which the court interpreted to refer
to regulations on conduct that does fall within the scope of the Second Amend-
ment); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 805 (2010) (“Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘presumptively
lawful,’ which, by implication, means that there must exist the possibility that
the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.”); United
States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding the constitution-
ality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) as a “presumptively lawful ‘longstanding prohibi-
tion[ ] on the possession of firearms,’ a category of prohibitions the Supreme Court
has implied survives Second Amendment scrutiny”) (emphasis added) (citing Hel-
ler, 554 U.S. at 626).
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scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee and that it even invoked
the First Amendment’s categorical exceptions when discussing the
limited scope of the right to keep and bear arms.132  Furthermore, the
Court itself called its list of presumptively valid regulations “excep-
tions” for which there are “historical justifications” and did so in the
context of an opinion that stressed that “[c]onstitutional rights are en-
shrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people
adopted them.”133  Courts that adopt the first approach have also fo-
cused on what Heller said immediately following its list of presump-
tively valid regulations:
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry
arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected
were those “in common use at the time.”  We think that limitation is fairly
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous
and unusual weapons.”134
This passage plainly refers to a class of arms outside the “protect[ion]”
of the Second Amendment’s guarantee, and some courts contend that
this passage in Heller equates laws prohibiting “dangerous and unu-
sual weapons” with the list of presumptively valid regulations that
immediately precedes the passage.135
On the other hand, courts that adopt the second approach also find
support in the language and decision method of Heller.  They note that
Heller declined to establish a standard of review for Second Amend-
ment claims, opting instead to invalidate the District of Columbia’s
gun laws on the ground that they would fail any standard of scrutiny.
Interpreting Heller’s exceptions as laws that pass any standard of
scrutiny would give the decision a certain symmetry, they observe.136
Furthermore, the historical pedigree of Heller’s list has never been es-
tablished, and courts have read Heller’s originalist approach to re-
quire the application of heightened review if a historical inquiry does
not definitively resolve the “scope” portion of the scope–scrutiny anal-
ysis.137  Finally, the Court used the term “presumptively lawful”—not
“categorically lawful”—to describe its list of longstanding regulations.
Lower courts adopting the second approach have often found this lan-
guage to indicate that as-applied challenges to Heller’s list of regula-
tions may well succeed.138  Such courts have therefore found it
inappropriate to treat them as categorical Second Amendment excep-
132. See, e.g., Bena, 664 F.3d at 1183.
133. Heller, 544 U.S. at 634–35; see, e.g., Bena, 664 F.3d at 1183; Marzzarella, 614
F.3d at 91.
134. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (emphases added) (citations omitted).
135. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.
136. See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 679.
137. See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 679–80; Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.
138. See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 679; Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.
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tions that fail at step one of the scope–scrutiny analysis and instead
will subject them to heightened scrutiny in as-applied challenges.139
C. Different Approaches to the Right to Armed Self-Defense
Outside the Home
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are also divided on the issue of
whether—and if so, to what extent—the Second Amendment protects
a right of armed self-defense outside the home.  Generally, most cir-
cuits have tried to avoid the question.140  The Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits, however, have directly stated that the right to armed
self-defense extends beyond the home,141 while the Fourth Circuit has
strongly suggested that it will decline to recognize such a right until
the Supreme Court provides further guidance on the issue.142  Finally,
139. See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 679; Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.
140. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2013) (in a
challenge where plaintiff waived argument as to ban on open carry of firearms,
holding that the concealed carry of firearms falls outside the scope of the Second
Amendment); Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012) (upholding revoca-
tion of a concealed weapons permit, noting that the Supreme Court has indicated
that prohibitions on concealed carry do not run afoul of the Second Amendment
and failing to address whether the right to bear arms openly extends beyond the
home); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 856 (2013) (rejecting facial challenge to Georgia law that pro-
hibits the carry of firearms in “places of worship” without the express prior ap-
proval of management, noting that trespass law was part of the historical
background of the Second Amendment); United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x
874 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010) (assuming, without decid-
ing, that the right to bear arms extends to one’s vehicle and upholding a convic-
tion for possession of a loaded handgun in a vehicle in a post office parking lot).
141. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–37 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down Illi-
nois’s flat prohibition on the carry of firearms in public and holding that the right
to bear arms is not limited to the home); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701
F.3d 81, 89 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (upholding
New York’s discretionary concealed carry licensing regime but recognizing that
Heller’s and McDonald’s analyses suggest “that the [Second] Amendment must
have some application in the very different context of the public possession of
firearms” and that “[t]he plain text of the Second Amendment does not limit the
right to bear arms to the home”); Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th
Cir. Feb. 13, 2014) (“[T]he carrying of an operable handgun outside the home for
the lawful purpose of self-defense, though subject to traditional restrictions, con-
stitutes ‘bear[ing] Arms’ within the meaning of the Second Amendment.”). Cf.
also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (granting preliminary
injunction against enforcement of Chicago ordinance that prohibited firing-range
training within city limits).
142. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474–76 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 756 (2011) (declining to decide whether the right to bear arms extends
past the home but strongly suggesting the court would confine the right to the
home in a future case, citing with approval a decision by Maryland’s highest
court that limited the right to the home) (citing Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479,
496, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011) (“If the Supreme Court . . . meant its hold-
ing to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly.”)); cf.
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while they have not squarely decided whether the Second Amendment
has application outside the home, the First, Tenth, and Third Circuits
have significantly weighed in on the potential scope of such a right.143
The Fourth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to exten-
sively comment on Heller’s potential applicability outside the home.
In United States v. Masciandaro,144 the Fourth Circuit upheld a de-
fendant’s conviction for possessing a loaded handgun in his vehicle
while inside a national park area.  Judge Paul Niemeyer wrote most of
the opinion for the panel but wrote separately to express his belief
that under Heller, the Second Amendment provides a “right to possess
a loaded handgun for self-defense outside the home . . . at least in
some form.”145  Judge Niemeyer’s colleagues refused to join in that
portion of his opinion.  Writing for the rest of the panel, Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson III explained that the case did not make it neces-
sary to decide the question because the panel unanimously agreed
that “intermediate scrutiny of any burden on the alleged right would
plainly lead the court to uphold the National Park Service
regulation.”146
Judge Wilkinson could have stopped there, but he continued to
make a broader point:
This case underscores the dilemma faced by lower courts in the post-Heller
world: how far to push Heller beyond its undisputed core holding.  On the
question of Heller’s applicability outside the home environment, we think it
prudent to await direction from the Court itself. . . . The notion that “self-
defense has to take place wherever [a] person happens to be,” appears to us to
portend all sorts of litigation over schools, airports, parks, public thorough-
fares, and various additional government facilities. . . . The whole matter
strikes us as a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon neces-
sity and only then by small degree.147
also Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-42,
2013 WL 3479421 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013).
143. Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72–74 (1st Cir. 2012) (rejecting a chal-
lenge to a Massachusetts gun license revocation, stating that the in-home posses-
sion of firearms for self-defense constitutes the “core” of the Second Amendment,
any purported right to defensively carry a firearm in public falls outside the core,
and even total prohibitions on concealed carry are presumptively lawful); Peter-
son v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013) (in a challenge where plaintiff
waived argument as to ban on open carry of firearms, holding that the concealed
carry of firearms falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment); Drake v.
Filko, No. 12-1150, 2013 WL 3927735 (3d Cir. July 31, 2013) (declining to decide
whether the right to bear arms has application outside the home and holding
that, even if it does, New Jersey’s restrictive standard for issuing licenses to carry
firearms in public is constitutional because it is “longstanding” and, alterna-
tively, would pass intermediate scrutiny).
144. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
145. Id. at 467.
146. Id. at 475.
147. Id. at 475 (quoting Volokh, supra  note 117, 1515) (internal citation omitted).
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In this passage, Judge Wilkinson cited with approval Williams v.
State,148 a case in which Maryland’s highest court held that the pos-
session of firearms in public falls outside the scope of the Second
Amendment.  In particular, Judge Wilkinson approved of Williams’s
statement that “[i]f the Supreme Court, in [McDonald’s] dicta, meant
its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so
more plainly.”149  Judge Wilkinson’s opinion thus signaled that if a
future case forces the Fourth Circuit to decide whether the Second
Amendment applies outside the home, the court will follow in Wil-
liams’s footsteps and hold that it does not.
Other federal courts of appeals have been less hesitant to acknowl-
edge Heller’s implications beyond the home.  In Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester,150 the Second Circuit upheld New York’s handgun licens-
ing scheme, which requires concealed handgun license applicants to
demonstrate “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from
that of the general community or of persons engaged in the same pro-
fession.”151  In doing so, the Second Circuit conceded that “the [Su-
preme] Court’s analysis [in Heller and McDonald] suggests . . . that
the Amendment must have SOME application in the very different con-
text of the public possession of firearms.”152  Indeed, “[t]he plain text
of the Second Amendment does not limit the right to bear arms to the
home,” the court observed.153  The Second Circuit, therefore, pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the right to bear arms extends beyond
the home but upheld New York’s restrictive licensing standard on the
grounds that “New York’s restriction . . . has a number of close and
longstanding cousins” and passes intermediate scrutiny.154
Just two weeks after the Second Circuit decided Kachalsky, the
Seventh Circuit struck down Illinois’s general ban on the carry of
loaded firearms in public in Moore v. Madigan.155  In a 2–1 decision
authored by Judge Richard Posner, the court concluded that a robust
right to bear arms extends beyond the home and that Illinois could not
148. Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011).
149. Williams, 417 Md. at 1177; see also Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (supporting the
holding in Williams).
150. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 1806 (2013).
151. Id. at 86 (quoting Klenosky v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 75 A.D.2d 793, 793 (1st
Dep’t 1980), aff’d on opinion below, 53 N.Y.2d 685 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
152. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89.
153. Id. at 89 n.10.
154. Id. at 89–101.
155. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).  It is worth mentioning that
before Moore, the Seventh Circuit had acknowledged that the right to bear arms
extends beyond the home. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir.
2011) (granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of Chicago ordinance
that prohibited firing-range training within city limits).
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make the “strong showing” required to justify its near-total prohibi-
tion on that right.156  The court began with the observation that the
Supreme Court’s historical analyses in Heller and McDonald strongly
imply a right of armed self-defense outside the home.157  Like the Sec-
ond Circuit, the court further noted that the right to “bear” arms—as
distinct from the right to “keep” them—probably did not refer to the
home.  “To speak of ‘bearing’ arms within one’s home would at all
times have been an awkward usage,” the court asserted.158  Addition-
ally, given the perils of life on the early American frontier, the court
found that “a right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in
the eighteenth century could not rationally have been limited to the
home.”159  Even in modern times, the court continued, one’s chances of
suffering a violent attack are much greater outside the home, and con-
fining the right of armed self-defense to the home would “create[ ] an
arbitrary difference” and “divorce the Second Amendment from the
right of self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.”160
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Illinois’s
prohibition was more restrictive than the New York permitting
scheme upheld by the Second Circuit in Kachalsky.  It nonetheless
took issue with Kachalsky’s “suggestion that the Second Amendment
should have much greater scope inside the home than outside,” given
that “the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the
home.”161  The Seventh Circuit also responded to Judge Wilkinson’s
concerns regarding the propriety of navigating this “vast terra incog-
nita,” observing that Heller and McDonald opened it up for explora-
tion and “[t]here is no turning back by the lower federal courts.”162
In the most recent and sweeping federal appeals court decision to
squarely address the issue, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held
in Peruta v. County of San Diego that the Second Amendment guaran-
tees a robust right to armed self-defense beyond the doorstep.163
Peruta involved a challenge to San Diego County’s restrictive con-
cealed carry issuance policy, which, in combination with California’s
overall regulatory landscape, effectively prohibited most citizens from
carrying firearms outside their homes for protection.164  In California,
the open carry of firearms is generally prohibited, as is the concealed
156. Moore, 702 F.3d at 935–40.
157. Id. at 935–36, 937
158. Id. at 936.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 937.
161. Id. at 941.
162. Id. at 942.
163. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014).
164. Id. at 3.
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carry of firearms without a permit issued by one’s city or county.165
California law allows a county or city to issue a concealed carry permit
only upon a showing of “good cause” by the applicant.166  Interpreting
this “good cause” requirement, the County of San Diego refused to is-
sue permits unless applicants demonstrated “circumstances that dis-
tinguish [them] from the mainstream”—a concern for “one’s personal
safety alone” would not suffice.167  In an opinion authored by Judge
Diarmuid O’Scannlain, the majority conducted an exhaustive textual
and historical analysis to determine the original public meaning of
“bear Arms.”168  This analysis led the majority to conclude that “the
Second Amendment [requires] that the states permit some form of
carry for self-defense outside the home,”169 and this form of carry—
whether open or concealed—must be available to the “typical respon-
sible, law-abiding citizen.”170  Because San Diego County effectively
prohibited concealed carry for all but a chosen few, and because state
law prohibited the only other possible carry method, the majority
found that the county’s policy “destroy[ed] (rather than merely bur-
den[ed]) a right central to the Second Amendment . . . .”171  The major-
ity, therefore, held that “Heller-style per se invalidation” was
appropriate and struck down the policy without applying any form of
scrutiny.172
Finally, while they have yet to squarely decide whether the Second
Amendment has application outside the home, the First, Tenth, and
Third Circuits have made significant contributions to the ongoing dia-
logue among the federal courts of appeals.  The First Circuit, in re-
jecting a challenge to a Massachusetts concealed carry license
revocation, stated that the in-home possession of firearms for self-de-
fense constitutes the “core” of the Second Amendment; therefore, any
purported right to defensively carry a firearm in public falls outside
the core.173  The court also observed that, specifically as to concealed
carry, the Supreme Court has stated that even total prohibitions do
not offend the Second Amendment.174  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, in
a lawsuit where a plaintiff waived his challenge to a ban on the open
165. Id. at 2–3 (discussing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25400, 25850, 26350, 26150, and
26155).
166. Id. at 2–3 (discussing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26150, 26155, and 26160).
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id. at 9–49.
169. Id. at 61.
170. Id. at 53.
171. Id. at 48.
172. Id. at 56, 77.
173. Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2012).
174. Id. at 73 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[T]he
majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibi-
tions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment
or state analogues.”); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897) (stating
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carry of firearms, relied on the same rationale to hold that the Second
Amendment does not protect a right to concealed carry.175  The court
was careful, however, to stress the narrowness of its decision.176  Most
recently, the Third Circuit joined the discussion when a divided panel
upheld New Jersey’s restrictive standard for issuing licenses to carry
firearms in public.177  The majority held that even if the Second
Amendment applies outside the home in some form, limiting that
right to the extraordinarily small number of citizens who can show an
“urgent necessity for self-protection” is constitutional because it is a
“longstanding” regulation and, alternatively, would pass intermediate
scrutiny.178
This area of Second Amendment law is still in flux, and the federal
courts of appeals continue to hotly debate the right’s applicability
outside the home.  Perhaps that is why, as of the time of this writing,
the Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari in any of these
cases, although its eventual intervention is inevitable.179  As section
in obiter dicta that the Second Amendment “is not infringed by laws prohibiting
the carrying of concealed weapons”)).
175. Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 2013) (relying on the
same passages from Heller and Robertson).
176. Id. at 1212 (“Peterson has affirmatively waived any challenge to the Denver ordi-
nance’s restriction on the open carrying of firearms.”).
177. Drake v. Filko, No. 12-1150, 2013 WL 3927735 (3d Cir. July 31, 2013).
178. Drake, 2013 WL 3927735 at *1, *2.  To meet this “urgent necessity” standard, an
applicant must point to “specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a
special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other than
by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.” Id. at *1.
179. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-42,
2013 WL 3479421 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701
F.3d 81, 89 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Georgia-
Carry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
856 (2013); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474–76 (4th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874
(5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010); see also Williams v. State, 417
Md. 479, 496 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011) (Maryland Court of Appeals
decision holding that possession of firearms in public falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment) .
As of this writing, a petition for certiorari is still pending in Drake, and it
appears that whether or not San Diego County seeks en banc review, a petition
for certiorari may also be forthcoming in Peruta.  The express conflict between
the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and the Fourth Circuit (and not to mention Ma-
ryland’s hightest court), and the tension—to put it mildly—between the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits and the Second and Third Circuits, will eventually necessi-
tate the Supreme Court’s intervention. See Eugene Volokh, Third Circuit Up-
holds New Jersey’s Highly Restrictive Scheme for Gun Carry Licenses, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (July 31, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/31/third-circuit-up-
holds-new-jerseys-highly-restrictive-scheme-for-gun-carry-licenses/ (guessing
there is a “decent chance” that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in Drake
because “[t]here is something of a split between the circuits and state supreme
courts that have upheld [restrictive permitting schemes], and the Seventh
Circuit”).
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II.C. describes, however, Heller and McDonald strongly imply a robust
right to bear arms for self-defense in public.180  It therefore appears
likely the Court will not keep the Second Amendment on house arrest
for much longer.  Even so, given that the Supreme Court itself has
affirmed the constitutionality of bans on the concealed carry of fire-
arms,181 recognizing a general right to armed self-defense would by no
means cripple the government from regulating the manner in which
firearms are carried outside the home.182  Additionally, even if the
Court recognizes a right to armed self-defense in public, lower courts
are very likely to disagree on the scope of that right183 and particu-
larly on their interpretation of Heller’s sensitive places exception to
the right.  As the next two Parts argue, lower courts—and especially
those that interpret Heller’s dictum to establish categorical Second
Amendment exceptions—should narrowly construe Heller’s sensitive
180. See discussion supra section II.C.
181. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897) (“[T]he right of the people
to keep and bear arms . . . is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons . . . .”); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
626 (2008) (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. . . . For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider
the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful
under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”).
182. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014) (“To
be clear, we are not holding that the Second Amendment requires the states to
permit concealed carry.  But the Second Amendment does require that the states
permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the home.”); Moore v. Madigan,
702 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] state may be able to require ‘open carry’—
that is, require persons who carry a gun in public to carry it in plain view rather
than concealed.”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 95–96 (2nd
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (acknowledging that the right to
bear arms extends beyond the home but noting that outright prohibitions of con-
cealed carry pass constitutional muster); Drake, 2013 WL 3927735, at *19 (3d
Cir. July 31, 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“The crux of these [state high
court decisions upholding concealed carry bans but striking down total carry
bans], endorsed by the Supreme Court [in Heller], is that a prohibition against
both open and concealed carry without a permit is different in kind, not merely in
degree, from a prohibition covering only one type of carry.”); Peterson v. Marti-
nez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Second Amend-
ment does not guarantee a right to carry firearms in concealment, and as
“longstanding prohibitions,” concealed carry bans pass muster at step one of the
scope–scrutiny analysis).
183. Compare Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 94 (“The state’s ability to regulate firearms and,
for that matter, conduct, is qualitatively different in public than in the home.”)
with Moore, 702 F.3d at 941 (disagreeing with Kachalsky’s “suggestion that the
Second Amendment should have much greater scope inside the home than
outside,” given that “the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside
the home”), and Peruta, No. 10-56971, at 56–57, 64–69 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014)
(equating a near-total prohibition on defensive handgun carry with the near-total
handgun ownership ban that Heller struck down and cataloguing disagreements
with Kachalsky).
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places passage in order to preserve Heller’s strong general rule in
favor of armed self-defense.
IV. THE DANGERS INHERENT IN ANALOGIES TO
CATEGORICAL FIRST AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONS
As described in the previous Part, some federal courts of appeal
regard Heller’s longstanding regulations, including prohibitions on
armed self-defense in sensitive places, as laws that conclusively re-
ceive no Second Amendment scrutiny.184  Their choice to do so is not a
completely unreasonable one, given Heller’s mixed messages on the
subject.185  That said, courts interpreting Heller’s list to establish cat-
egorical Second Amendment exceptions have good reason to narrowly
construe it, especially as it relates to sensitive places.  Declaring a
law-abiding citizen’s ability to defend himself—what Heller called the
“central component” of the Second Amendment right—to receive no
constitutional protection in a given location is very serious busi-
ness.186  Too many exceptions could swallow Heller’s strongly implied
184. See, e.g., United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958
(2011).
185. See discussion supra section III.B.
186. Cf. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (finding that just as restraint is necessary when
extending the logic of categorical exceptions for unprotected speech to new types
of speech, “prudence counsels caution when extending [Heller’s] recognized excep-
tions to novel regulations unmentioned by Heller”); Drake, 2013 WL 3927735, at
*16 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“Our hesitance to recognize additional exceptions
[beyond those listed in Heller] is unsurprising in light of the fact that by doing so
we are determining that a certain regulation is completely outside the reach of
the Second Amendment . . . . ”); Drake, 2013 WL 3927735, at *22 (Hardiman, J.,
dissenting) (“As we and other courts have stated, we must be cautious in recog-
nizing new exceptions to the Second Amendment.  After all, finding that a regula-
tion is longstanding insulates it from Second Amendment scrutiny
altogether . . . . Accordingly, unless history and tradition speak clearly, we should
hesitate to recognize new exceptions.”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638,
649–50 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (warning that placing con-
victed domestic violence misdemeanants completely outside the Second Amend-
ment’s protections is dangerous).
On the other hand, Judge Wilkinson suggested that the Fourth Circuit would
confine Heller to the home because “circumscrib[ing] the scope of popular govern-
ance” is “serious business.”  United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of
Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009) (ar-
guing that Heller, like Roe v. Wade, improperly cut short the democratic process
with a debatable interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional command).  It
bears mentioning, however, that Judge Wilkinson has not hesitated to circum-
scribe popular governance in other contexts when he thought the Constitution
required it.  As one example, Judge Wilkinson risked a circuit split while offering
a novel, expansive interpretation of the Establishment Clause that cut short the
democratic process. Compare Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir.
2011) (Wilkinson, J., for the court) (declaring unconstitutional a local govern-
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right of self-defense outside the home.  Courts should hesitate to take
the value that lies at the core of the Second Amendment and place it
wholly outside the Constitution’s protections.
Strikingly, the analogy to categories of unprotected speech under-
scores the gravity of its use.  True, the First Amendment right has its
exceptions, but they are limited to those “well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
ha[ve] never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”187
Even nude dancing, the historical protection and societal value of
which is debatable,188 has been found by courts to receive some basic
quantum of constitutional protection.189  It would be unwise for courts
to broadly interpret Heller’s sensitive places while equating them with
categorical First Amendment exceptions, giving absolutely no protec-
tion to the core of the Second Amendment where citizens most often
need it: outside the home.190  Courts that treat Heller’s sensitive
places as categorical Second Amendment exceptions therefore have
great reason to narrowly confine them.
Additionally, a critical difference between the right to free speech
and the right to armed self-defense highlights a special danger of rid-
dling Heller’s right with too many geographic exceptions.  If a person
ment’s prayer policy that randomly invited religious leaders from the commu-
nity—regardless of their religious or denominational affiliation—to offer
nonproselytizing prayers to open public meetings), with Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty.,
547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding, under Supreme Court precedent, a
similar prayer policy).  To the extent that Judge Wilkinson is willing to circum-
scribe the scope of popular governance with a debatable interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause but at the same time unwilling to enforce a right to armed
self-defense clearly implied by the Court in Heller and McDonald, one might won-
der whether Judge Wilkinson has heeded the Court’s command that the Second
Amendment not be treated as a “second-class right.”  McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010) (plurality opinion); id. at 3058–88 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (like the plurality, declining
to treat the right to keep and bear arms as a second-class right).
187. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (emphases added).
See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 649 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (warning against imprecise
analogies to categorical First Amendment exceptions in the Second Amendment
context).
188. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 573 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (observing that the challenged ban on completely nude dancing “is in
the line of a long tradition of laws against public nudity, which have never been
thought to run afoul of traditional understanding of ‘the freedom of speech’”).
189. See, e.g., id. at 566 (plurality opinion) (observing that totally nude dancing “is
expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though
we view it as only marginally so”); id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (agreeing that totally nude dancing receives some First Amendment pro-
tection); id. at 587 (White, J., dissenting) (same).
190. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME VIC-
TIMIZATION SURVEY FOR 2004–08, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm
?ty=tp&tid=44 (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (reporting that from 2004 to 2008, only
26.7% of violent crimes occurred in the home of the victim).
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passes through a restricted location in the First Amendment context,
he regains the ability to speak freely immediately upon exiting the
location.191  Not so with the right to bear arms.  To avail oneself of his
right to armed self-defense after passing through a restricted location,
one has to first retrieve his firearm, which he likely will have stored
off-site.  Unlike with First Amendment rights, increasing the number
of restricted locations has the potential to chill the exercise of Second
Amendment rights.  Having to pass through several restricted loca-
tions in a day will dissuade a person from exercising his right to
armed self-defense in other locations due to the burden of continually
storing and retrieving his means of defense.  This problem generally
does not arise with First Amendment rights because the ability to
speak follows a person wherever he goes.
In short, regarding Heller’s sensitive places as categorical Second
Amendment exceptions while at the same time adopting an expansive
interpretation of them would run a serious risk of undermining the
very value that the Second Amendment most strongly protects.  As the
next Part demonstrates, lessons from other areas of First Amendment
law counsel in favor of a restrained interpretation of even Heller’s enu-
merated sensitive places—schools and government buildings.
191. For example, take nonpublic and limited public forums, where the government
may constitutionally impose even content-based restrictions on speech.  In non-
public forums, the government may exclude speakers as long as it does not do so
on the basis of their viewpoint and the exclusion is otherwise reasonable in light
of the property’s purpose.  Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
682 (1988).  In limited public forums, exclusions of speakers who do not fall
within the class to which the forum has been held open also merit only reasona-
bleness review, even if the class has been defined on the basis of content. See
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set.  The State may not exclude speech where its distinc-
tion is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum . . . .”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1975, 1989 (2011) (summarizing the constitutional rules applicable to lim-
ited public forums).
A speaker may therefore have to refrain from communicating his message in a
limited or nonpublic forum if that message would violate the forum’s “lawful
boundaries,” but he regains his freedom to speak his mind as soon as he exits the
restricted location.  At a public university’s town hall meeting with a politician,
for instance, the university may prohibit attendees from speaking out of turn or
shouting epithets at the guest, but an attendee wishing to voice his criticism of
the guest or shout out of turn regains the freedom to do so as soon as he steps
outside. Cf., e.g., University of Florida Student Tasered at Kerry Forum, YOU-
TUBE (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bVa6jn4rpE (depict-
ing a public university student’s controversial—but arguably lawful—arrest for
refusing to comply with a town hall meeting’s rules).
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V. HOW FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES SUGGEST A
CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO HELLER’S ENUMERATED
SENSITIVE PLACES
Just as they do with the First Amendment’s categorical exceptions,
courts regarding Heller’s sensitive places as categorical Second
Amendment exceptions should narrowly confine them to those few ar-
eas where bans on the carry of firearms “have never been thought to
raise any [c]onstitutional problem.”192  But what should lower courts
do about Heller’s enumerated sensitive places—“schools” and “govern-
ment buildings”?  These examples from Heller may at first glance ap-
pear unambiguous, but closer examination reveals that they are not.
The term “schools” might refer to primary and secondary schools only
or also to post-secondary colleges and universities.  The Supreme
Court’s reference to “government buildings” might encompass only ac-
tual structures where sensitive government business takes place or
might instead broadly imply that the government may prohibit armed
self-defense whenever it acts as property owner.  This Part argues
that lessons from First Amendment student-speech jurisprudence and
public-forum doctrine caution against expansive interpretations of
Heller’s listed sensitive places.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to deal with an obvious objection.
Some courts and commentators have cautioned against the wholesale
importation of First Amendment doctrines into Second Amendment
jurisprudence.193  This Article heeds their warning.  The argument
here is not that First Amendment forum doctrine and student-speech
jurisprudence should be cloned and imported in unmodified form di-
rectly into Second Amendment doctrine.  Rather, this Part argues
merely that broad themes from First Amendment law, at some level of
generality, suggest a cautious approach to interpreting Heller’s enu-
192. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
193. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (cautioning against the wholesale importation of
“substantive First Amendment principles” and declining to apply prior-restraint
doctrine to Second Amendment claims); Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to
Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49,
99 (2012) (“The right to free speech differs in important descriptive, normative,
and functional ways from the right to keep and bear arms.  As a consequence,
analogies to First Amendment doctrine offer very little help in formulating Sec-
ond Amendment doctrine.”).  Not all commentators share Professor Magarian’s
skepticism of First Amendment analogies. See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds & Bran-
non P. Denning, How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Second Amend-
ment: A Reply to Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89 (2013) (“The
Court’s efforts [to modernize the Second Amendment by emphasizing individual
self-defense], we argue, dissolve any ostensible tension between the rights guar-
anteed by the First and Second Amendments and should ease Professor
Magarian’s anxieties about the suitability of an individual right to private arms
ownership in a liberal democracy.”).
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merated sensitive places.  Even courts that have warned against the
blanket adoption of First Amendment doctrines have nonetheless
looked to broad themes in other areas of constitutional law—including
the First Amendment—as guideposts.194  This Article follows in their
footsteps.
A. “Schools”—Student-Speech Jurisprudence and the
Secondary–Post-Secondary Distinction
Heller listed schools as an example of a sensitive place where flat
gun bans will presumably pass muster.  Setting aside the unique is-
sues raised by laws that prohibit guns in public university campus
housing,195 in public university classrooms,196 and in private colleges
194. See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91–94 (cautioning against the wholesale impor-
tation of “substantive First Amendment principles” and declining to apply prior-
restraint doctrine to Second Amendment claims but nonetheless looking to the
Supreme Court’s obscenity, Fourth Amendment, and sexual-privacy decisions for
the proposition that the right to bear arms should receive substantially less pro-
tection outside the home; Kwong v. Bloomberg, No. 12-1578, 2013 WL 3388446,
at *4 (2d Cir. July 9, 2013) (applying First Amendment fee jurisprudence to a
Second Amendment challenge to New York’s gun licensing fees); see also United
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 649 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissent-
ing) (acknowledging that “[a]dapting First Amendment doctrine to the Second
Amendment context is sensible in some cases” but disapproving of the Seventh
Circuit’s offhanded comparison of domestic violence misdemeanant-in-possession
bans to categorical First Amendment exceptions); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651
F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Labels aside, we can distill this First Amendment
doctrine and extrapolate a few general principles to the Second Amendment
context.”).
195. Students who challenge gun bans in public university housing may draw on Hel-
ler’s and McDonald’s emphases on the “home” and argue that the government
cannot constitutionally condition access to campus housing on the relinquish-
ment of the right to keep and bear arms. See generally Volokh, supra note 117, at
1529–33 (discussing the special considerations at play when the government re-
stricts constitutional rights in public housing).  In fact, an Idaho state trial court
recently confronted and rejected such a claim. See Tribble v. State Bd. of Educ. &
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Idaho, SMARTGUNLAWS.ORG, http://smartgunlaws.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/TribbleDecision.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
196. Colleges certainly have a greater interest in regulating student conduct in the
classroom learning environment than they do on other parts of campus where
classroom instruction does not take place.  On the other hand, one could make a
strong argument that lawfully concealed firearms—which by definition must re-
main hidden from sight—have much less potential to disrupt the learning envi-
ronment than Tinker’s unconcealed armband. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517–18 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing
the disruption caused by high school students’ wearing of armbands to protest
the Vietnam War).  Perhaps future scholarship might explore how the fact of a
firearm’s concealment should factor into the balance between college students’
right to armed self-defense and their schools’ interest in regulating classroom
conduct for the education and safety of their students.
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that object to the carry of firearms on their property,197 what should
lower courts do with untailored general prohibitions on the carry of
firearms on college campuses? Heller did not specify whether its
schools category should encompass post-secondary educational insti-
tutions,198 but broad lessons from student-speech jurisprudence sug-
gest that colleges and universities are less sensitive than primary and
secondary schools.  Courts, and especially those that interpret Heller
to establish categorical Second Amendment exceptions, should there-
fore interpret Heller’s “schools” to encompass only primary and secon-
dary educational institutions.
As a starting point, the Supreme Court has made clear that stu-
dents do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”199  The Court has relied on this
proposition to protect students’ Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process and Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.200  It would be inconsistent with these precedents to
hold that the Second Amendment offers no protection at all for law-
abiding, adult students at public universities who—unlike primary
and secondary school students—fall within the Second Amend-
ment’s guarantee.201  College students do not forfeit their consti-
197. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the Framers wove into the fabric of the
Second Amendment traditional notions of criminal law, tort law, and private
property law, which have always protected the right of private property owners to
exclude unwanted visitors or activities from their land.  GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v.
Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261–66 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 856
(2013).
198. As used in this Article, the terms “post-secondary educational institution,” “col-
lege,” and “university” all refer interchangeably to institutions of higher learning
where first-year students typically have attained the age of eighteen.
199. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.  The Court further held: “Students in school as well as
out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.  They are possessed of funda-
mental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect
their obligations to the State.” Id. at 511.
200. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (citing Tinker for the proposition that
public school students “do not ‘shed their constitutional rights’ at the schoolhouse
door”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (citing Tinker and Goss and
observing that “[i]f school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to un-
derstand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public
authority when conducting searches of their students”).
201. Heller stressed that the Second Amendment right inheres most strongly in “law-
abiding, responsible citizens.”  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635
(2008) (emphasis added).  Several federal courts of appeals have suggested that
the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to juveniles and may not even
fully extend to those below the age of twenty-one. See, e.g., United States v. Rene
E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (upholding a partial federal ban on the possession of
firearms by juveniles); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding a federal law
that prevents those under the age of twenty-one from purchasing handguns from
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tutional rights simply because they step onto a public university
campus.202
At the same time, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the
First Amendment’s protections do not sweep as widely for students in
a classroom as they do for adults.203  For example, high schools may
punish even silent, passive expressions of opinion that “materially and
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school” or “in-
volve[ ] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”204
They may also prohibit “vulgar and lewd speech” that would “under-
mine the school’s basic educational mission.”205  The Court has simi-
larly allowed a high school to punish students for displaying a sign at
a school event that could be “reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use.”206  And in what many commentators have lamented as the
Court’s most restrictive interpretation of students’ free speech rights,
the Court held in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier that high
schools may “exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”207
Interestingly, each of these decisions limiting student speech
rights took place in the high school context,208 and the Supreme Court
placed a strong emphasis on the youth and immaturity of the speakers
(and listeners).  In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court
upheld a high school’s suspension of a student for his delivery of a
vulgar student government campaign speech, emphasizing that the
licensed dealers and noting that twenty-one was the age of majority at the time
the Second Amendment was ratified).
202. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (“[Public school students] do not shed their constitu-
tional rights at the schoolhouse door.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (observing that the
Court’s student speech cases affirm that “the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings”).
204. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
205. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
206. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
207. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).  For scholarly criti-
cism of the Hazelwood decision and arguments why it should not be extended to
the public university context, see Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares
College Media: To Protect Free Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons from the
“College Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN. L. REV. 481 (2001); Mark J. Fiore, Comment,
Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case Against Extending Hazelwood to
College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2002).
208. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our . . . cases dealing with the
right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been
confined to high schools, whose students and their schools’ relation to them are
different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college
education.”) (internal citations omitted).
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First Amendment does not permit “children in a public school” as
much latitude as “adults in other settings.”209  The Court called the
student who delivered the offensive remarks a “confused boy,” noting
that his sexually explicit language “could well be seriously damaging
to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and
on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.”210  In Hazelwood,
the Court upheld a high school principal’s decision to censor portions
of a school newspaper issue that described students’ experiences with
pregnancy and parental divorce.  The Court reasoned that schools
“must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the in-
tended audience in determining whether to disseminate student
speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the ex-
istence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to . . . teenage
sexual activity in a high school setting.”211  In Morse v. Frederick, the
Court upheld a high school principal’s suspension of students who, at
a school event, unfurled a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS.”212  In its opinion, the Court called the students “schoolchil-
dren” and emphasized the effects of illicit drug use among “young peo-
ple,” declaring that schools have an “important—indeed, perhaps
compelling interest” in deterring youth from illegal drug use.213
These dicta suggest as a general proposition that older and more
mature college students might enjoy broader constitutional rights
than their primary and secondary school counterparts, and that col-
leges and universities are less sensitive than elementary, middle, and
high schools.214  The Supreme Court has even suggested in other con-
texts that the First Amendment distinction between secondary and
post-secondary students may be one of kind and not simply degree.215
Coincidentally, in Hazelwood, the Court expressly recognized the
possibility that students’ free speech rights might admit a secon-
209. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (emphases added).
210. Id. at 683 (emphases added).
211. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
212. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 403 (2007).
213. Id. at 407 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our . . . cases dealing with the
right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been
confined to high schools, whose students and their schools’ relation to them are
different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college
education.”) (internal citations omitted).
215. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276–77 n.14 (1981) (in an Establish-
ment Clause case, noting that “[u]niversity students are, of course, young adults.
They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appre-
ciate that the University’s policy is one of neutrality toward religion.”); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (observing that “[t]he college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas”) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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dary–post-secondary distinction, although it declined to decide the
question.216  Facing this lack of clear guidance, lower courts have di-
vided over whether Hazelwood’s extremely deferential standard
should apply in the university setting,217 but even those courts that do
apply it to post-secondary curricular student speech have recognized
that what counts as reasonable editorial control may vary from the
high school context to the college context.218  These cases add further
support to the notion that colleges and universities are generally less
sensitive than primary and secondary schools.
Given these lessons from student-speech jurisprudence, lower
courts that interpret Heller to establish categorical Second Amend-
ment exceptions should narrowly interpret Heller’s “schools” and sub-
ject general gun bans on public college and university campuses to
some form of heightened review, rather than uphold them at step one
of the scope–scrutiny analysis.  The Supreme Court has made clear
that students do not give up their constitutional rights simply because
they find themselves on a college campus, and courts have often sug-
gested that the secondary–post-secondary distinction matters in the
First Amendment context.  It should matter in the Second Amend-
ment context, as well.
B. “Government Buildings”—First Amendment Forum
Doctrine and the Government as Property Owner
The Fifth Circuit has recognized in an unpublished opinion that
the government generally has much broader authority to regulate the
carry of firearms on its own property than it does in other locations.219
216. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273–74 n.7 (“We need not now decide whether the same
degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive ac-
tivities at the college and university level.”).
217. Compare, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding
Hazelwood’s standard to apply in the context of post-secondary education); Ax-
son-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (same), and Ala. Student
Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1989)
(same), with Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (refusing to
apply Hazelwood in the post-secondary educational context), and Student Gov’t
Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir.
1989) (“[Hazelwood], in which the Court held that a high school newspaper whose
production was part of educational curriculum was not a public forum, is not ap-
plicable to college newspapers.”).
218. See, e.g., Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734 (“To the extent that the justification for editorial
control depends on the audience’s maturity, the difference between high school
and university students may be important.”).
219. See United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010) (affirming defendant’s conviction for possessing a handgun
in his car on property belonging to the U.S. Postal Service, observing that unlike
in Heller, the government’s restriction “stemmed from its constitutional authority
as the property owner”).
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No serious scholar would disagree.220  The sticking point for courts in
post-Heller challenges will be defining the precise contours of the gov-
ernment’s authority to prohibit the defensive possession of firearms on
its property, given the ambiguity of Heller’s “government buildings”
phrase.  Courts might interpret Heller’s government buildings phrase
to stand for the proposition that the government enjoys unlimited au-
thority in this area and that it may ban firearms whenever it acts as
property owner.  Or courts might instead narrowly interpret Heller’s
dictum to mean that the government enjoys broad authority to ban
firearms only in actual buildings where sensitive government busi-
ness takes place.  This latter interpretation would draw a distinction
between such buildings and other types of public property.
The interaction between the general public’s221 individual liberties
and the government’s authority as property owner is nothing new to
constitutional law.  First Amendment forum doctrine in particular
comes to mind.  Modern forum doctrine is premised on the notion that
the scope of the government’s authority to limit the exercise of individ-
ual liberties on its property hinges on “the character of the property at
issue.”222  The Supreme Court has developed a fairly comprehensive
sliding-scale approach to handling First Amendment claims on gov-
ernment property, wherein the strength of such claims depends al-
most entirely on whether the subject property is classified as a
traditional public forum, designated (or “limited”) public forum, or
nonpublic forum.223  Certainly then, a one-size-fits-all approach to
Second Amendment claims on government property would fail to har-
monize with this most basic theme of First Amendment law.  Even the
broadest analogy to public-forum doctrine, therefore, counsels
strongly against an interpretation of Heller that would give the gov-
ernment unfettered power to prohibit firearms on its property in all
circumstances.224
220. See Volokh, supra note 117, at 1473 (2009) (describing how the government’s au-
thority to restrict individual liberties generally expands when it acts as
proprietor).
221. This Article focuses on the relationship between the government as property
owner and the general public to demonstrate the need for a restrained interpreta-
tion of Heller’s “government buildings” passage.  It does not address, for example,
the special relationship between the government and public housing tenants or
the government and its employees.  For general observations about how Second
Amendment doctrine might develop in those specific contexts, see id. at 1473–75,
1529–33.
222. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
223. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 & n.7; see also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130
S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) (using the terms “traditional public forums,” “desig-
nated public forums,” and “limited public forums”).
224. Cf. Volokh, supra note 117, at 1533 (“Courts need to work out a government-as-
proprietor doctrine for the right to bear arms much as they have done for the
freedom of speech.”).
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Another basic theme of First Amendment forum doctrine—the
public’s ability to acquire a right by longstanding historical use—sug-
gests that citizens’ Second Amendment rights should receive height-
ened protection on at least some types of government property.  In the
First Amendment context, the government’s authority to regulate
speech in “traditional public forums” such as parks, streets, and side-
walks, is narrowly circumscribed.225  The heightened protection of
free speech in those locations owes to the fact that “they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”226  Com-
mentators have described this special protection of free speech as a
prescriptive easement-type right by which longstanding public use of
government property justifies curtailment of the government’s author-
ity as property owner.227
This broad theme of First Amendment forum doctrine bears obvi-
ous application at the very least to national parks, which have “imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind,” have accommodated the right to bear arms.  American citizens
have historically enjoyed the freedom to carry firearms in national
parks for protection against dangerous wildlife, and severe restric-
tions on that freedom did not come about until 1984.228  As one small
but enlightening illustration, the father of America’s national parks
225. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
226. Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
227. See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1163 (2005) (calling the Supreme Court’s rationale for
affording heightened protection to speech in traditional public forums the “pre-
scriptive easement” justification).
228. The U.S. Department of the Interior prohibited the carry of loaded firearms in a
small number of national park areas in 1966 but even then allowed the killing of
“dangerous animals when it is necessary to prevent them from destroying human
lives or inflicting personal injury.” See 31 Fed. Reg. 16652 § 2.11, 31 Fed. Reg.
16655 § 2.32 (Dec. 29, 1966).  In 1984, the Department strengthened its restric-
tions on the carry of firearms in national parks, generally prohibiting the practice
with only a few narrow exceptions. See 49 Fed. Reg. 18450 § 2.4 (Apr. 30, 1984);
Court Decision Blocks Guns in National Parks, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29781541/ (observing that heavy restrictions on the
carry of loaded firearms in national parks “were adopted by the Reagan adminis-
tration in the early 1980s”).  On January 9, 2009, the Department, acting at Con-
gress’s command, changed the existing general prohibition on the carry of loaded
firearms in national parks to generally allow carry in accordance with state law.
See 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 461 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1a-7b(b) (stating that “The
Secretary of the Interior shall not promulgate or enforce any regulation that pro-
hibits an individual from possessing a firearm . . . in any unit of the National
Park System or the National Wildlife Refuge System if the individual is not oth-
erwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm and the possession of the
firearm is in compliance with the law of the State in which the unit . . . is lo-
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himself, John Muir,229 was known to travel with companions who car-
ried rifles.230  Muir even acknowledged in one of his writings that he
once picked up a rifle in Yosemite to defend himself and others against
a bear.231  In light of national parks’ historical accommodation of the
right to bear arms, courts may find it appropriate to proceed to step
two of the scope–scrutiny analysis if they confront a Second Amend-
ment challenge to a carry restriction in a national park.232
cated.”).  The practice of severely restricting the carry of firearms in national
parks thus dates back only to 1984 and lasted for just twenty-five years.
229. See, e.g., Who Was John Muir?, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/john_
muir_exhibit/about/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (“John Muir . . . was America’s
most famous and influential naturalist and conservationist. . . . He has been
called ‘The Father of our National Parks’ . . . . His words and deeds helped inspire
President Theodore Roosevelt’s innovative conservation programs, including es-
tablishing . . . Yosemite National Park by congressional action.”).  As Professor
John Nagle observes:
John Muir was the “publicizer” of wilderness.  Beginning in 1868, Muir
hiked thousands of miles throughout the wild areas of the southeast,
Yosemite, and Alaska.  Muir then wrote about his experiences, founded
the Sierra Club, and worked to persuade federal and state officials to
preserve the lands he had visited.  Muir often used biblical language to
express the wonders of wilderness lands.  Muir believed “that while
God’s glory was written over all His works, in the wilderness the letters
were capitalized.”
John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 35 ENVT’L L. 955, 976
(2005) (quoting RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS IN THE AMERICAN MIND 125
(4th ed. 2001)) (footnotes omitted).
230. See, e.g., JOHN MUIR, THE YOSEMITE 240, 246 (Century Co. 1912), available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/writings/the_yosemite/chapter_15.
aspx (describing how Galen Clark, the “most amiable of all [Muir’s] mountain
friends,” often “would take his rifle . . . and go off hunting” in the Yosemite Valley,
and “he always shot a deer, sometimes a grouse, and occasionally a bear”); JOHN
MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS 181–82 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1901), available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/writings/our_national_parks/chap-
ter_6.aspx (describing how “[t]he most famous hunter of the [Yosemite] region”
would use his rifle to shoot bears and had told Muir that he and his dog had “ ‘had
close calls at times’”).
231. JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 184 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1911),
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/writings/my_first_sum-
mer_in_the_sierra/chapter_5.aspx (“I reluctantly went back to camp for [a com-
panion’s] rifle to shoot [a bear that ventured too close to camp], if necessary, in
defense of the flock.  Fortunately I couldn’t find him, and after tracking him a
mile or two towards Mt. Hoffman I bade him Godspeed and gladly returned to my
work on the Yosemite dome.”).
232. Because federal law currently makes state firearms possession laws applicable in
national parks, parks located in states with strict gun carry laws may be the
target of future Second Amendment challenges. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h) (“Notwith-
standing any other provision in this Chapter, a person may possess, carry, and
transport concealed, loaded, and operable firearms within a national park area in
accordance with the laws of the state in which the national park area, or that
portion thereof, is located, except as otherwise prohibited by applicable Federal
law.”) (emphasis added).
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This historic right to the defensive carry of firearms might also be
said to extend to undeveloped government property in general, and
especially any remote locations that provide habitats for large
predators.  In Heller, the Supreme Court suggested that the right to
armed self-defense extends especially to those places where the need
for protection is “acute.”233  The United States is home to a variety of
large predators such as grizzly bears, cougars, and wolves, and the
need for self-defense is certainly “acute” in the areas that these ani-
mals call home.234  Courts should regard such land—and any other
public property where a broad right to carry firearms may historically
have been permitted235—as a sort of “traditional public forum” in the
Second Amendment context.  At the very least, courts should not read
Heller’s “government buildings” to encompass all government-owned
property, and they should subject bans on the defensive carry of fire-
arms in national parks and remote public lands to some form of
heightened scrutiny.
Finally, one more important theme permeates First Amendment
forum doctrine that may prove instructive in the Second Amendment
context.  In all types of government property—even nonpublic forums,
where the government’s ownership power is at its height and citizens’
right to free speech is at its low watermark—the government lacks the
233. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
234. See, e.g., Karl Vick, Bear Attacks Hit Record High in Alaska, WASH. POST, Aug.
17, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/16/AR
2008081601930.html (noting that a record eight Alaskans suffered bear maulings
between January and August 2008 and quoting an Alaskan Fish and Game De-
partment biologist as stating: “Most places in Alaska don’t have a persistent
problem with bear or moose, because if it’s anywhere near the village, they shoot
it, no questions asked.”); see also, e.g., Francis v. Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., No.
20111027, 2013 WL 3788798 (Utah July 19, 2013), available at http://www.
utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Francis1343071913.pdf (allowing parents of a de-
ceased bear-attack victim to bring a negligence suit against the State) (last vis-
ited July 21, 2013); id. at 19–23 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state
should receive statutory immunity from suit because dangerous wildlife is a “nat-
ural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands”); Alaska Dep’t of Fish &
Game, The Essentials for Traveling in Bear Country, STATE ALASKA, http://www.
adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=livingwithbears.bearcountry (recommending
that hikers in bear country who have experience with firearms and wish to carry
one for protection should choose a powerful weapon such as a “.300-Magnum rifle
or a 12-guage shotgun with rifled slugs” and noting that “[h]eavy handguns such
as a .44-Magnum may be inadequate in emergency situations”) (last visited Sept.
4, 2013).
235. Several states allow the carry of firearms on a variety of nonpark government-
owned property.  As one small example, Wisconsin recently authorized its citi-
zens to carry firearms in the state’s Capitol. See Concealed Carry Frequently
Asked Questions, WISC. DEP’T ADMIN., http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docview.asp?
docid=8991&locid=0 (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).  Future scholarship might seek
to explore the prevalence, scope, and historical roots of similar practices in other
states, as well as the recent nature of any current restrictions on such practices.
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power to tread on the First Amendment’s most sacred protection: the
guarantee against viewpoint discrimination.236  Although perhaps
somewhat of a stretch beyond Heller’s and McDonald’s core right of
“self”-defense, courts might find that the Second Amendment contains
a similar basic guarantee, such as a guarantee that the government
may only disarm law-abiding, adult members of the general public on
its property if it makes reasonable provision for their safety.  Courts
examining flat prohibitions on the defensive carry of firearms on gov-
ernment-owned property might therefore subject them to meaningful
review if the government does not conduct sensitive business in those
locations and has no armed security or metal detectors to assure the
visiting public’s safety.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the right secured by the Second Amendment, like others se-
cured by the Bill of Rights, is not unlimited, a broad view of Heller’s
sensitive places exception has the potential to swallow Heller’s strong
self-defense rule.  As lower courts have begun to develop Second
Amendment doctrine in the wake of Heller and McDonald, many have
looked to the First Amendment and have analogized Heller’s presump-
tively valid laws to regulations on categories of speech that receive no
constitutional protection, such as obscenity and incitement.  This
analogy is appealing, but it also illustrates why courts should not take
a broad view of Heller’s dictum.  In the First Amendment context, cat-
egories of speech that receive no constitutional protection have been
kept to a very small number, with strict definitions to avoid infringe-
ments on even marginally protected speech.  In the same way, the vast
majority of Second Amendment claims should receive some type of
scrutiny or the right will mean little.  Courts that interpret Heller’s
presumptively constitutional regulations as categorical Second
Amendment exceptions should therefore narrowly confine them to
their historical roots to prevent the Second Amendment from falling
back into its pre-Heller oblivion.  As this Article has shown, lessons
from First Amendment forum doctrine and student-speech jurispru-
dence in particular caution against a broad reading of even Heller’s
enumerated sensitive places—schools and government buildings.
This is not to say that laws banning the carry of firearms on college
campuses, national parks, and remote public lands are necessarily un-
constitutional.  Rather, this Article has advanced the more narrow ar-
gument that law-abiding litigants who challenge such laws should at
236. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(“Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”) (emphasis added).
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the very least be entitled to their day in court, and the government
should bear the burden to prove the ban’s constitutionality under
some form of heightened review.  In the First Amendment context,
courts have narrowly confined categories of speech that receive no con-
stitutional protection to preserve the broad scope of the guarantee, but
they have also recognized that constitutional protection and govern-
mental regulation are not mutually exclusive.  So should it be with the
Second Amendment.
